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Run for your life: Spectacle primaries and the success of 'failed' primary candidates

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**RUN FOR YOUR LIFE:
SPECTACLE PRIMARIES AND THE SUCCESS OF
'FAILED' PRIMARY CANDIDATES**

BY

SEAN PATRICK MCKINLEY

THESIS

**Submitted to the University of New Hampshire
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of**

**Masters of Arts
in
Political Science**

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
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


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
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


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
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Abstract

RUN FOR YOUR LIFE: SPECTACLE PRIMARIES AND THE SUCCESS OF 'FAILED' PRIMARY CANDIDATES

By

Sean Patrick McKinley

University of New Hampshire, September, 2013

This thesis qualitatively examines the personal career outcomes of major presidential primary candidates from 1976-2008. It argues that the primary process fundamentally changed with the introduction of reform in the 1970s. It has continued to evolve into the "spectacle primary," a system whereby mere participation, not necessarily electoral success, can convey manifold benefits to subsequent careers in the public or private sectors. It also finds far less risk in primary participation than conventional wisdom might assume. Therefore, this thesis holds that prospective candidates when weighing a presidential primary bid, should consider these ulterior benefits beyond electoral success and all else being equal, they should decide to enter presidential primary contests.

Chapter I - Introduction

One might be forgiven for assuming that in electoral politics, victory simply begets success while defeat begets failure. This logic makes sense in the hyper-competitive environment of the presidential nomination process; to the victor goes the spoils of nomination while the losers receive ostensibly nothing for their effort but ignominious defeat. Therefore, when a politician considers entering a presidential primary,¹ the intuitive calculus is to weigh their chance of winning the nomination against the estimable costs. If the possibility of securing the nomination seems remote, conventional wisdom might dictate that the time, expense and risks of a grueling campaign might make such a venture not worthwhile. But this logic relies upon the assumption that winning the nomination contest is the only possible benefit of the modern nomination process. It ignores the ability of viable primary participants to advance themselves despite being electorally unsuccessful in their bid for the presidential nomination. This thesis examines the personal outcomes of primary participants since 1976 and prevailing trends in primary politics. From this, it argues that the modern primary system offers extensive and diverse potential personal opportunities to its viable participants while entailing extremely low personal risk.

This is only possible because of the utter transformation of the presidential nominative process from the self-contained “autonomous conventions”² of the 19th

century to its present incarnation. Nominating a presidential candidate is now a spectacle; it is an incomparable venue and vehicle for its participants to advance themselves in their personal future endeavors in the public or private sector notwithstanding their failure to secure the nomination. This “spectacle primary” affords the opportunity for its participants to acquire experience, prestige, and visibility amongst the voting public, party elites, political operatives and potential employers.

These potential benefits can be seen in the historical record of the many unsuccessful primary candidates since the inception of the spectacle primary system in the 1970s. What little attention is paid to these unsuccessful candidates is typically an electoral post-mortem attempting to diagnose the campaign’s cause of death. But the personal outcomes of these unsuccessful candidates indicate that there is less risk and more opportunity in a presidential primary than conventional wisdom might assume. The losers of these contests have not all been exiled into the political wilderness. On the contrary, many have thrived in their careers in the public or private sectors.

The spectacle primary has been facilitated by a parallel exponential growth and diversification of the media, particularly in its coverage of politics. Media coverage of “autonomous convention”³ system and its “smoke-filled back-rooms” was largely in the form of traditional print media. Since then, radio, television and internet mediums have provided an incessantly growing level of coverage of the process. Today, the public has extensive access to intense, real-time, visual coverage of even completely specious and

early political events that have little to no bearing on the actual nomination. Without this radical change in coverage, the change in the nominative process alone likely would yield far fewer opportunities for public exposure of candidates. The fusion of structural and normative changes to the primary process with the media's expanded coverage has created an unparalleled platform for politicians to benefit their personal futures.

This of course does not mean that anyone can simply file papers to run for President and instantly be transformed into a political celebrity with their pick of lucrative career choices. Only those candidates who are publicly recognized as presidential candidates inherently will have the opportunities afforded to primary participants. One might think this would exclude only a few marginal candidates, but in fact hundreds of people file official papers with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to run for President every election cycle. In the 2012 presidential cycle alone there were four hundred and thirty eight officially filed presidential candidates.⁴ We are not concerned with the vast majority of these people; the focus of this work is the effect of the presidential primary process on the outcomes of its "viable" participants.

To attain an accurate understanding of this effect, we should take a comprehensive look at the potential benefits and downsides of entering the primary process and the likelihood of these occurring. The most obvious benefit one could garner is being chosen as their party's presidential nominee. This is clearly a very

valuable possibility given the chance of being elected to the presidency. Yet most entrants in presidential primaries will not garner their party's nomination. Especially for more marginal candidates wavering on entering, their hope of winning the nomination is quite remote. Post-reform primaries in both parties historically tend to be won by candidates in the top tier of support and name recognition in very early primary polling.⁵ While there is typically considerable movement amongst the other candidates before the conclusion of a primary cycle,⁶ the nomination process as a whole is favorable towards frontrunners.⁷

For these more major candidates with a clear path to their party's nomination, potential benefits from a primary defeat are likely less important to their decision-making process. Furthermore, these kind of well-known candidates stand to gain less than their more obscure counterparts precisely because they are already relatively familiar and supported; Hillary Clinton for example was likely already quite well-known and respected before her presidential run in 2008.⁸ The "benefits of losing" are still relevant to their calculus, but less crucial.

But for a somewhat marginal candidate equivocating on a presidential bid, the possibility of tangible personal and political benefits from mere participation in the primary process could plausibly decisively tip the scales in favor. Their chance of securing their party's nomination may be small, but as long as they are able to establish themselves as viable contenders for the nomination, they stand to benefit from the

spectacle of the primary process in whatever venture they pursue after their defeat. And it appears that this trend is accelerating over time, as increasing amounts of candidates with increasingly atypical previous experiences enter the primary process with little hope of victory and nonetheless find lucrative or prestigious subsequent opportunities.

ARE ELECTIONS ONLY ABOUT RESULTS?

The majority of scholarly work and media coverage on American elections is result-centric, attempting to forecast or better understand electoral outcomes. Presidential electoral politics alone consists of a broad range of specific inquiries; amongst innumerable examples, some try to construct quantitative models to predict presidential general elections replete with various criteria or variables such as economic conditions.⁹ Others attempt to use more quantitative methods to discern presidential outcomes.¹⁰ Still others attempt to better understand voter decision-making, ranging from how voters form their opinions¹¹ to the effect of the weather of voter turnout.¹²

This research almost inevitably pursues a similar objective. In primary election contests, the majority of popular and academic electoral work is ultimately concerned with the victorious candidate and why they won, or upon the unsuccessful candidates and why they did not win.¹³ This focus makes sense, but it neglects to examine a salient aspect of electoral politics, the effects of the electoral process itself beyond the direct outcome, specifically upon its participants.

A small amount of scholarly literature addresses this aspect of electoral politics, but typically the effects upon candidates themselves are referenced only tangentially in pursuit of another topic. Some examine candidates' decision to withdraw from a primary cycle, including ulterior goals beyond securing the nomination in their decision-making.¹⁴ There is also a brief mention of the prototypical "advocacy candidate," one more interested in advancing an ideology or issue than winning the primary contest.¹⁵ However, this author was unable to find any scholarly work that directly addresses what happens to primary candidates who lose, or challenge the assumption that these candidates have harmed their future personal prospects.

This thesis helps ameliorate this dearth of research by directly addressing evolving factors in the primary process and their effect on the subsequent outcomes of unsuccessful candidates. This kind of analysis requires a shift in the typical perception of politics and elections. It compels us to think about the options and choices of political figures not necessarily as the means to good public policy or even electoral victory, but to see them through the self-interested prism of public choice theory.

Public choice is a branch of political theory that examines the machinations of political systems through the prism of economics.¹⁶ It assumes that the motivation for political figures and bureaucracies is not, as commonly believed, the promotion of the public good, but is derived from a mix of political and economic self-interest.¹⁷ Public

choice theory places individuals' decision-making within the political system and considers self-interest as a vital factor in that decision-making.

METHODOLOGY

A QUANTITATIVE OR QUALITATIVE APPROACH?

A seemingly ideal way to understand the effect of presidential primary participation on candidates would be to design a semi-experimental study that examined the career of primary entrants using a pretest/posttest model with their failed candidacy as the intervening variable. If we used a clear quantitative statistic such as candidate income, we could demonstrate the potential benefits of primary participation in a straightforward and tangible way.

However, this strategy has a number of problems. Firstly, the financial records of former candidates are not public information unless they remain in government after their primary bid. Even these former candidates need only provide an estimate, limiting the effectiveness of a quantitative study. For many candidates, especially the less recent ones, information on their post-bid income is going to be an estimation at best and more likely incomplete or absent altogether.

Even if we had this information, using strictly quantitative methods to elucidate solely tangible benefits would not necessarily afford a comprehensive understanding of individuals' career outcomes. Career success, especially amongst political figures, is not

just about income; one of the possible desired goals could be a job with high amounts of prestige but that is not necessarily highly paid.

Instead of using this more simplistic method of quantitative measurement, this study examines the careers of the viable primary candidates from 1976-2008 and attempts to qualitatively demonstrate prevailing beneficial trends of primary participation. To do this we need to select a population of unsuccessful primary candidates to investigate their personal outcomes. Determining this population is not as straightforward as one might assume because such a large amount of people officially seek the presidential nominations in each election cycle. Of these, only a very select few are widely known by the public or recognized by the media. These candidates stand to benefit from their primary participation precisely because the public is aware of their candidacy; those who are not widely known inherently will not. If all official candidates were included in this study, the results would be corrupted by the overwhelming number of candidates who, while they were official candidates, did not really participate in the primary process in any meaningful way.

CANDIDATE VIABILITY AND THE STANDARD FOR INCLUSION

Therefore, we need to include only those “viable” presidential candidates whose personal outcomes can be affected by their participation in the primary process. Differentiating between “viable” and “non-viable” candidates is not a simple task

Figure 1.1

Viableⁱ Presidential Primary Candidates Who Did Not Garner Their Party's Nomination: 1976-2000

Candidate	Year	Party	Candidate	Year	Party
Bayh, Birch	1976	Democrat	Harkin, Tom	1992	Democrat
Bentsen, Lloyd	1976	Democrat	Kerrey, Bob	1992	Democrat
Byrd, Robert	1976	Democrat	Tsongas, Paul	1992	Democrat
Church, Frank	1976	Democrat	Buchanan, Pat	1992, 1996	Republican
Harris, Fred	1976	Democrat	Alexander, Lamar	1996	Republican
Humphrey, Hubert	1976	Democrat	Gramm, Phil	1996	Republican
Jackson, Scoop	1976	Democrat	Lugar, Richard	1996	Republican
McCormack, Ellen	1976	Democrat	Forbes, Steve	1996, 2000	Republican
Reagan, Ronald	1976	Republican	LaRouche, Lyndon	1980, 1996, 2000	Democrat
Shriver, Sargent	1976	Democrat	Keyes, Alan	1996, 2000, 2008	Republican
Udall, Mo	1976	Democrat	Bauer, Gary	2000	Republican
Wallace, George	1976	Democrat	Bradley, Bill	2000	Democrat
Brown, Jerry	1976, 1980, 1992	Democrat	McCain, John	2000	Republican
Anderson, John B.	1980	Republican	Braun, Carol Mosely	2004	Democrat
Baker, Howard	1980	Republican	Clark, Wesley	2004	Democrat
Bush, George H. W.	1980	Republican	Dean, Howard	2004	Democrat
Connally, John	1980	Republican	Lieberman, Joe	2004	Democrat
Crane, Phil	1980	Republican	Sharpton, Al	2004	Democrat
Kennedy, Edward	1980	Democrat	Edwards, John	2004, 2008	Democrat
Cranston, Alan	1984	Democrat	Kucinich, Dennis	2004, 2008	Democrat
Glenn, John	1984	Democrat	Biden, Joe	2008	Democrat
McGovern, George	1984	Democrat	Clinton, Hillary	2008	Democrat
Hart, Gary	1984, 1988	Democrat	Dodd, Chris	2008	Democrat
Jackson, Jesse	1984, 1988	Democrat	Giuliani, Rudy	2008	Republican
Gephardt, Dick	1988, 2004	Democrat	Gravel, Mike	2008	Democrat
Dole, Bob	1988	Republican	Huckabee, Mike	2008	Republican
du Pont, Pete	1988	Republican	Hunter, Duncan	2008	Republican
Gore, Al	1988	Democrat	Paul, Ron	2008	Republican
Kemp, Jack	1988	Republican	Richardson, Bill	2008	Democrat
Robertson, Pat	1988	Republican	Romney, Mitt	2008	Republican
Simon, Paul	1988	Democrat	Thompson, Fred	2008	Republican

i - Garnered 1% or more of the national primary vote or 5% or more of the vote in a single primary contest

Sources: Cook (2000), *Presidential Elections: 1789-1992* (1995), "Dave Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections."

because the American electoral process has no concise, comprehensive standard or official threshold to definitively discriminate between the two. Especially early in the primary process, candidate viability is a rather amorphous concept grounded more in perception than in tangible fact. In the so-called “viability primary,” voters have extremely limited information on potential candidates and largely must rely upon “stature and reputation.”¹⁸ Elites play a large role in this process as their endorsements give cues to voters, the media, contributors, activists and aligned groups about which candidates are viable.¹⁹ Later in the process, primary voters mainly make their judgment of a candidate’s viability and electability on their past performance in earlier primary contests.²⁰

Despite this intangible quality, for most of the filed candidates for President the determination is quite obvious. The vast majority of official candidates have never held elected office, have never appeared in any form of mainstream media as candidates, and receive extremely few, if any, votes. But it is far more difficult for candidates on the margins whose viability is somewhat debatable.

Something as straightforward as polling numbers could ameliorate this problem, but primary polling was far less prolific in earlier election cycles. Nor does there appear to be an overwhelming effort to preserve even relatively recent primary polling data. Because of this, we do not have consistent, comprehensive, reliable polling data to determine viability for the majority of the time period since 1976. Therefore I used an

intuitive standard, including any candidate who received at least one percent of the national primary vote or five percent within a given state. This allows for candidates with broad but shallow appeal, those who get small vote shares but in many places, as well as candidates with deep but narrow appeal, those who get a more significant amount of votes but only in one or a few primary contests. This also accommodates candidates who withdraw from the race early and therefore receive very little of the national vote because their name was not on the ballot or their campaign was suspended during later primaries. Using these candidates, we can construct a timeline of their major employment before and after their presidential bids and make summative observations about the data, trying to notice distinctive trends amongst the candidates.

RECENT CANDIDATES AND LIMITATIONS

The lion's share of examples are from more recent presidential primary candidates for two reasons: far more data is available for these candidates than participants in earlier primaries and because the spectacle primary system seems to be an increasing phenomenon with a more profound impact on 2012 candidates than ones from 1976 when the spectacle primary was in its infancy.

The 2012 Republican primary cycle illustrated many salient concepts and therefore many candidates and elements from that cycle are included in this work as well. However, the losing candidates are not included in the pre/post bid career

analysis because the election was too recent to know enough about what their subsequent careers will look like. Nevertheless, many of them were quite cogent examples that merited inclusion in the thesis.

Because we are dealing with the complexities of individuals' lives and careers, we cannot isolate a primary bid as an independent variable and come to indubitable conclusions. There is also a relative paucity of data, and therefore a chance of randomness being mistaken for a trend. Since 1976, only sixty-two people have established themselves as "viable" presidential candidates and not won their party's nomination in that election cycle. Furthermore, presidential primaries only take place quadrennially, and it is rare for both parties to have a competitive primary in the same year. Many election cycles, such as the most recent 2012 election, feature only one party with a competitive primary. Given this relative infrequency, we cannot necessarily conclude trends are changing due to a single election cycle. With these limitations, this study is not necessarily indisputable, but it is a compelling circumstantial case that uses reasonable methodology and the best readily available data to elucidate the effect of the primary process on its participants.

Chapter II - Changing Structures

THE EVOLUTION OF THE PRIMARY

THE AUTONOMOUS CONVENTION SYSTEM

Politicians did not always have the opportunity to benefit from presidential primary defeat. It has only emerged because of the evolution and gradual transformation of the nomination system for presidential candidates and the coverage of these races by the media. The current nomination system bears little resemblance to the cloistered and brief process that prevailed before the reforms of the Progressive era and the 1970s. Presidential candidates were nominally selected by a group of party adherents at the party convention, but in reality were chosen by a quite small group of party elites who largely directed the voting of the party delegates.²¹ It was undoubtedly still quite a spectacle and in some ways was less predictable than the present-day primary system.

But crucially, the spectacle was one confined temporally and physically to the party convention. Rather than unfolding over months or years, crucial decisions were often made in a matter of days and sometimes even hours. The real decision-making was made not by individual delegates on the convention floor but in proverbial and

often literal smoke-filled back-rooms. Delegates themselves, much less the wider voting public, often were not privy to internal negotiations and the proposed or discussed alternative candidates. This lack of awareness of the process meant that those ultimately not selected as presidential candidates gained very little visibility if any at all. Thus a quixotic primary bid intent on acquiring ancillary benefits would be foolish. In fact, norms at the time prohibited any campaigning at all for a presidential nomination prior to the convention.²²

THE PROGRESSIVE REFORMS AND THE BREAKDOWN OF THE SYSTEM

Reformists such as Robert LaFollette bemoaned the democratic deficit of this system and called for each citizen to have the choice of a direct vote without party interference.²³ Progressive era reforms seemingly brought this about with the introduction of primaries and caucuses with the purpose of empowering individuals and party adherents. Yet this did not substantially change the elite-domination of the selection of a presidential nominee.²⁴ Entering a primary and securing broad popular support was not a prerequisite for the nomination. While some primaries apportioned delegates to victorious candidates, many simply afforded an opportunity for party elites to receive input from the party faithful and to allow prospective candidates to demonstrate their electability.²⁵

This byzantine system with such indirect voter participation inevitably created tension between the party elites and the rank-and-file; it finally became completely untenable with the “outrageous” 1968 Democratic nomination of Hubert Humphrey for President.²⁶ The Democratic Party was in turmoil, torn between the image of the party dominated by moderates and traditional Democratic factions and the emerging more liberal and fiercely anti-war vision of the party. Two candidates who epitomized this latter wing entered the primary contests as anti-war alternatives to sitting Democratic President Lyndon Johnson.²⁷ Minnesota Senator Eugene McCarthy took this audacious step first, lambasting Johnson’s support for the Vietnam War and performing quite well in the New Hampshire primary.²⁸ At this sign of Johnson’s vulnerability, Robert Kennedy, who had been equivocating on a primary bid, jumped into the fray as a second anti-war alternative.²⁹ Besieged by opposition to the Vietnam War and now faced with an insurgency by two challengers within his own party, Johnson withdrew his bid for renomination. However, both McCarthy and Kennedy were not overly palatable to the old-guard Democratic party bosses, who implored Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, who had lost the nomination to John F. Kennedy in 1960, to run and govern more in the mold of Johnson.³⁰ Despite entering no primaries, Humphrey garnered enough elite support within the party to receive the nomination at the convention over the reeling anti-war faction’s choice of McCarthy following the assassination of Robert Kennedy.³¹ The selection of Humphrey demonstrated that

despite the introduction of primaries that ostensibly had empowered the party rank-and-file, elites had largely retained the power to choose presidential nominees.

THE MCGOVERN-FRASER REFORMS AND THE GENESIS OF THE SPECTACLE PRIMARY

Many within the Democratic Party saw the nomination of Humphrey as so patently illegitimate that it soon became the *casus belli* for meaningful reform of the nomination system. Bowing to pressure and hoping to unite the fractured party, Humphrey agreed to the formation of a committee for this purpose.³² While the attempts at reform during the Progressive era through the introduction of primaries had had a largely cosmetic effect, these McGovern-Fraser reforms would be meaningful, resulting in a gradual but substantive shift in nominative power away from elites and towards the party's rank-and-file.³³

The McGovern-Fraser reforms were not, however, a legally binding set of changes to electoral law. The committee itself was merely an internal creation of the Democratic Party tasked with improving their nomination process.³⁴ But the new primary system it helped create solidified and spread to the Republican Party through indirect means.³⁵ Some state legislatures controlled by Democrats adopted new primaries and reasoned that the new process might be used for the Republican party as well.³⁶

Beyond this institutional change, the new system immediately produced more competitive Democratic primaries in 1972 and 1976.³⁷ These contests provided a view of the new electoral landscape for later prospective Democratic and Republican candidates and attracted significant media attention in a relatively modern way for the first time.³⁸ Between these institutional and normative changes, the Republican Party soon adopted very similar election procedures as their Democratic counterparts. Before long, no candidate could expect to win their party's nomination without entering most or all primary contests, the number of which began steadily increasing after the adoption of reform.³⁹

THE STRUCTURE OF THE NEW SYSTEM

ACADEMIC UNDERSTANDING OF PRIMARY PROCESS

Scholars have identified some overarching rules or at least tendencies that have emerged in the contemporary primary system. While momentum is not the sole determining factor,⁴⁰ strong electoral outcomes in the earliest primary contests have a clear and significant effect on a candidate's fortunes,⁴¹ particularly in Democratic Party races.⁴² In those earliest primary contests, electability was a significant voter consideration in addition to general evaluations of the candidates seeking the nomination.⁴³ Rank-and-file party members are much more important than in the pre-reform system, but elites and semi-elites still play a significant role.⁴⁴

THE BIFURCATED BENEFITS OF PRIMARY PARTICIPATION

The benefits of primary participation can be broken down roughly into two categories; practical benefits and perception benefits. Practical benefits are tangible advantages a former viable candidate can enjoy, such as already having a relationship with campaign professionals if a candidate decides to run for President again. Perception benefits are less concrete, but equally important. They include the effect of participation in a primary on public notions of the candidate's visibility, likability and gravitas.

For those seeking employment in the private sector, the less concrete cachet of being a former presidential candidate is a more important factor. This prestigious epithet combined with their moment in the sun during the primary provides a sufficient boost to these candidates' public profiles for them to garner numerous private sector jobs that they might otherwise not have secured. Yet their experience of the campaign did very little if anything to prepare them or make them better at these private sector jobs. If a former candidate becomes a pundit or a paid speaker, the principal difference provided by their primary experience is that people are more likely to be interested in listening to them pontificating than they otherwise might be.

Alternatively, should a candidate wish to continue their career in the public sector, practical benefits play a larger role. This is not to say that perception benefits are

completely unimportant. A former primary entrant seeking appointment to a governmental post may profit from the prestige of being a former primary participant. But the vast majority of candidates who remain in the public sector stay in elected office, and they can use the practical benefits of their primary experience to aid in their reelection to these positions or perhaps higher elected offices.

THE ELONGATED CALENDAR

The crucial distinction between the old and new primary systems for the self-interested candidate is the development of an increasingly lengthy process with meaningful primaries and large-scale candidate participation. As the amount of competitive primaries increased and the first contest of each election cycle took place earlier in the year, the process offered increasing opportunities to captivate public attention. Nor is the primary season confined to the beginning of the official primary voting that itself now occurs nearly a year before the general election. The “invisible primary,” a period of intense competition for endorsements, operatives and funding, now begins almost immediately after the end of the previous election. Events such as the Ames Straw Poll, whose outcome actually led to a candidate’s withdrawal in 2012, begin more than a year before the general election, stretching the effective primary calendar even further.

Primary debates, which offer an important opportunity for politicians to introduce and legitimize themselves as presidential candidates, have increased manyfold as well. In 1976, the first year of the post-reform period, Ronald Reagan challenged President Ford for the Republican nomination and seven viable candidates vied for the open Democratic nomination. Yet there were only three debates, all of the Democratic side, with the first taking place in February.⁴⁵ The two-party total increased to six in 1980, eleven in 1984, and twenty-one in 1988.⁴⁶ During the most recent electoral cycle in 2012 with only a Republican primary, twenty debates were held, the first of which took place in mid-2011, almost a year and half before the general presidential election.⁴⁷⁴⁸

THE CAMPAIGN EXHAUSTION OF FRED THOMPSON

While the current nomination system offers a bevy of potential personal and political opportunities, what should not be forgotten or understated is how relentless and grueling a process it has become. Earlier in electoral history, candidates faced a less laborious workload; William McKinley was able to largely wage his general election campaign from his home in Ohio and a prospective presidential candidate might experience only a single day of competition for the nomination. Since then, the process clearly has profoundly changed. The new spectacle primary system has utterly changed modern campaigning and could just as easily be termed “the exhausting

primary system.” The very reasons the primary is now an opportunity for self-aggrandizement also inevitably entail more physical and mental effort on behalf of the candidates. It is now entirely feasible for candidates to begin unofficially running for President directly after the previous mid-term election, or even not long after the previous presidential contest, almost four full years before the general election. For those who run in successive primary cycles, such as Mitt Romney in 2008 and 2012, a candidate could expect to be essentially running for President for almost eight years.

The duration of the campaign inevitably becomes physically and psychologically wearing on candidates. A modern example of a candidate being perhaps surprised by the strains or having changed their mind in their commitment to the campaign is the somewhat farcical candidacy of Fred Thompson in 2008. Thompson entered the race with much fanfare at a time marked by a perceived dearth of appealing Republican candidates.⁴⁹ But Thompson almost immediately appeared to lack the necessary work ethic or impetus to conduct a successful modern campaign. Reports surfaced that his wife was the more prolific campaigner of the two. One observer opined, “I don’t think he really wants the job. He seems to be treating it as a part-time effort, a nice way to pass the time of day.”⁵⁰ His campaign manager in New Hampshire was so disaffected by Thompson’s lethargy that he defected to John McCain’s campaign, saying, “Fred Thompson would have been a good candidate, but he doesn’t want to go out and campaign.”⁵¹

This is an important cost for a prospective primary entrant to consider before their entry. But extensive campaigning and mental effort is essentially the job of a politician with national aspirations, and one would expect them to tolerate these rigors. Perhaps for a candidate such as Thompson with more simple aspirations for his retirement, the process was too burdensome to be worthwhile. But for most prospective primary entrants, even those with a quite distant chance of securing their party's nomination, entrance into a primary would seem worth the effort to partake in the moment for self-aggrandizement and the unlocking of future opportunities.

THE INFLATION, INDEBTEDNESS AND AVOIDANCE OF PRIMARY SPENDING

Another consequence of the primary process's incessant growth in length and intensity is the exponential growth in political spending. Recent nominees have almost always raised more money than any other candidate in the year before an election.⁵² Beyond the effort required to raise this money, the high financial demands of a modern campaign can impact a candidate's personal financial position. In the 2012 Republican primary, Mitt Romney spent \$76 million, or \$18.50 per primary vote.⁵³ For someone of Romney's wealth and fundraising prowess, there was little chance of him becoming personally indebted as a result of this spending for the long-term. But for many other candidates who need to at least approach such spending levels, avoiding significant

personal debt is a pressing concern. While this seems like it would be a fleeting problem, the amount of money and the duration of the debt can in some cases be substantial. Despite the massive amounts of money that candidates seem to be able to raise, it is a quite different matter to raise money to retire the debt of an already failed candidacy.

Hillary Clinton's long and ultimately unsuccessful campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2008 left her mired in debt that reportedly at one point totaled \$25 million. With aid from the Obama campaign following her concession and the fundraising help of her husband after the general election, Clinton was able to pay off her debt but only did so after the 2012 election, more than four years after she conceded the 2008 Democratic nomination to Barack Obama.⁵⁴ As of February, 2013, Newt Gingrich continues to work to pay down the \$4.7 million lingering debt from his presidential campaign.⁵⁵

While it would seem to be more of a problem in recent elections when the amount of money involved in political campaigning has increased, presidential candidates from earlier electoral cycles were not immune from these issues either. John Glenn sought the Democratic presidential nomination in 1984 and amassed a debt of \$3 million.⁵⁶ However, there is no legal deadline when campaign debt must be repaid. While the lingering debt is likely quite irritating, a candidate John Glenn can take their time repaying their debt without it likely significantly impacting their personal standard of living. Glenn needed twenty-three years to retire his debt via small

individual donations but finally did alleviate himself of his campaign debt in 2007.⁵⁷ Nor is it inevitable to run one's campaign into significant debt. Ron Paul managed to maintain a campaign surplus in 2012 and is now able to use that money for other causes.

Furthermore, the advent and proliferation of Super PACs has lessened the need for personal fundraising to maintain a primary campaign. While ostensibly independent, in 2012 each of the major Republican primary contenders had "unofficially official" Super PACs supporting their candidacies. As Newt Gingrich bore the brunt of the better-financed Mitt Romney, Sheldon Adelson, a billionaire casino owner, came to his rescue with a check for \$5 million to Gingrich's Super PAC.⁵⁸ Adelson later floated the idea of contributing \$10 or \$100 million dollars to Gingrich or some other candidate.⁵⁹ With his "unofficially official" Super PAC, underwritten by a small number of wealthy individuals, shouldering a significant amount of the spending responsibility, Gingrich's campaign itself only needed to spend \$21 million.⁶⁰ In this new political finance environment, the importance of direct spending by a candidate's campaign is substantially mitigated. A candidate wary of being left in debt need not seriously endanger their candidacy if they decide to cut back on direct spending because Super PACs, with access to unlimited donations, can carry a large portion of the spending burden.

And candidates whose main goal is self-promotion do not necessarily need to spend on a comparable level to the frontrunners to remain viable candidates and thereby achieve their aims. Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama spent unprecedented amounts of money in their fierce primary contest in 2008 to be sure; a less plausible candidate like Chris Dodd did not spend anywhere near as much. Yet Dodd and others did not need to do so to remain in the conversation, be invited to debates, and generally be perceived as a legitimate presidential candidates. Especially with the aid of a “unofficially official” sponsoring Super PAC, a candidate does not really need to even spend significant amounts of time raising money for their own campaign; they can simply rely on the unlimited donations to Super PACs to remain in the race. In this way, a self-interested candidate needs not even risk personal debt in the process.

WHY DO THEY STAY?

In almost every primary, it seems inevitable that at least one candidate lingers in the contest, sometimes even to the point when the primary is effectively over, and another candidate begins to be labelled the “presumptive nominee.” The endurance of their campaigns suggests that there might be value in the perpetuation of campaigns beyond the goal of actually securing the nomination.⁶¹ However, once the primary enters this later stage with the overall outcome no longer really in doubt, the contest

receives far less public attention and therefore its participants have less opportunity to promote themselves or their ideas.

It appears from scholarly and historical evidence that greater opportunities are available to low-profile and issue advocacy candidates by perpetuating their losing candidacies than more well-known candidates.⁶²⁶³ This makes a good deal of intuitive sense; a candidate with high public visibility has little to gain from continued media coverage. Especially if this candidate is interested in continuing their political career, their portrayal as a primary loser who cannot accept their fate could leave their reputation substantially damaged.

But some candidates, those with few future political ambitions, have little to lose from remaining in the primary competition. Ron Paul's 2012 candidacy is quite instructive on this point. Having run for President in 2008 and done surprisingly well on a libertarian platform, Paul again sought the Republican nomination in 2012 but with little feasible chance of success. He had also announced his intention not to simultaneously seek reelection to the House of Representatives and intended to retire from politics if did not secure the Republican nomination for President.

Paul thereby met both conditions for a candidate with a vested interest to remain in the race. He had no planned political future and therefore could endure the potential political costs of lingering in the race. He also had a clear and distinct ideology that he had voraciously promoted. Paul himself admitted to his supporters after Romney had

mathematically clinched the nomination that he would not officially withdraw so that he and they could continue promoting his brand of libertarianism through the Republican convention.⁶⁴

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE POLITICAL MEDIA

THE LEVIATHAN MEDIA

This increasingly heavily loaded and lengthened electoral process would be inconsequential without the exponential increase in the scale and variety of media coverage. Today, the media has become a leviathan, growing to a scale that has changed the way that people consume political information. The intense coverage and conveyance of importance on the process by the media is the veritable *sine qua non* of the spectacle primary.⁶⁵ To put it more evocatively, the media acts as “a St. Peter guarding the gates of the presidential nomination process judging which candidates are worthy of precious news space.”⁶⁶ Through this coverage, a viable candidate becomes better known by the public and can be elevated to a more prestigious position as a former contender for their party’s nomination.

Modern political media coverage bears little resemblance to the pre-reform period before the 1970s. The autonomous convention system gave little if any opportunity for failed candidates for the nomination to gain any public exposure via the

political media. Political norms prohibited open pre-convention lobbying for the nomination and the convention itself took place relatively quickly behind closed doors with no mechanism to test the political strength of prospective candidates amongst the public.⁶⁷ After the Progressive-era reforms and the introduction of mainly non-binding primaries, the media paid somewhat more attention to some contests when a major candidate had deigned to enter or when a relative unknown was attempting to prove his political strength, such as Kennedy's crucial performance in Wisconsin in the 1960 primary cycle.⁶⁸ But the amount of coverage was mild relative to the present-day precisely because most primary contests only indicated a candidate's strength and did not directly translate into tangible results as most primary contests now do.

The media was also far less diverse in form and far less technologically capable of political coverage than the modern political media. Previous electoral coverage was confined to print, radio and relatively short news programs on network television. Technological advances have facilitated new methods of national and even international campaigning.⁶⁹ As the first post-reform primaries in both parties raged in 1976, cable news and the internet did not yet exist. Their development throughout the 1980s and 90s has fundamentally transformed how we look at politics and in particular the primary process.

Part of the reason for the massive amounts of political coverage on television is that larger cable news outlets like Fox News, CNN and MSNBC have massive amounts

of time in their schedules to fill with some kind of news coverage. Lengthy presidential primary contests fill this void quite well. Long before any actual primary contests or even the first primary debate, the media can engage in the presidential primary process simply through speculation about the potential candidates. While these kind of “will they or won’t they” stories are typically rather light on actual reporting, they provide a valuable mechanism for the media to attract interest in even a very distant primary contest.

THE POLITICAL MEDIA AS ARBITRATORS OF CANDIDATE VIABILITY

Once the field of presidential candidates has begun to form, the media has substantial power in determining who is worthy of inclusion in the group of “viable” candidates. The viability of some primary contenders is never really in doubt. For instance, as sitting Vice-President, Al Gore was inevitably going to be perceived as a major viable candidate for the 2000 Democratic nomination. But for more marginal entrants, the designation is not so obvious. Perception is the crucial element because there are no concrete criteria to anoint a candidate as viable.

Viability and momentum are crucial components to a successful campaign, yet they are quite vague and intangible. Collective notions of a candidate’s “expectations” are extremely difficult to determine. Thus the same electoral outcome can alternatively be seen as a setback or prompt Bill Clinton to pronounce himself the “Comeback Kid.”⁷⁰

Therefore, the distinction between viable and non-viable candidates often becomes a self-fulfilling judgment; a candidate who is perceived as viable likely will in fact be viable. In fact, some scholars argue that the main determinant of the all-important momentum a candidate needs to survive and flourish in primary campaigns is simply subjective media coverage of the candidate.⁷¹

The media exert substantial influence on this perception through a variety of direct and indirect means. While once media effects were seen as a myth or of minimal import, some emerging scholarly evidence points to the contrary.⁷² During the “invisible primary” the media plays a pivotal role in determining the field of viable candidates. This tends to lend itself to helping frontrunners, since the media has an interest in featuring viable and potentially successful candidates and because frontrunners have more access to the national press and the broader national electorate.⁷³ At this point in the process, candidates have little money on hand to build much-needed name recognition, making free and potentially positive news coverage highly important.⁷⁴ Even humorous political media shows such as *The Colbert Report* have the potential to act as media cues to voters, as an appearance on the show and thereby receiving the much-celebrated “Colbert Bump” appears to actually positively impact a candidate’s donation figures.⁷⁵

The media appears to support certain candidates to whom they are more personally amenable as well as give more attention to candidates who have electoral

momentum.⁷⁶ They also of course have a heavily vested interest in maximizing their viewership by the public. Therefore they have a powerful incentive to devote their time to those candidates that are seen as viable or interesting by the public. This selective power is substantial, as they act simultaneously as a reflection and determinant of a candidate's viability in the public mind. But ultimately, the decision to include a candidate in important primary moments like debates or to attach a reporter to a campaign, or to include their name as a possible candidate in a poll are largely arbitrary, driven not just by public opinion but by media elites' personal opinions and biases.

This power is exercised in a variety of direct and indirect means. Media outlets commission an astounding and consistently growing number of polls. The first survey of likely Republican primary voters for the 2012 nomination, conducted by Rasmussen Reports, took place a single day after the 2008 general election.⁷⁷ This was followed by a further one hundred and ninety-five primary polls for the Republican nomination until the effective conclusion of the race in April 2012.⁷⁸ Whether a marginal candidate is included amongst the list of names to be asked of respondents can have a profound initial effect upon their name recognition and the perception that they are legitimately in the race for the presidential nomination.

INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION IN PRIMARY DEBATES

But perhaps the most direct means for the media to wield inclusion or exclusionary power is through the venue of primary debates. It is generally agreed upon in academic circles that general election debates have minimal impact upon voter choice and “tend to reinforce preexisting attitudes and preferences.”⁷⁹ Primary debates, however, lacking the partisan and ideological differences that largely neuter the effect of general election debates, have been found to have a more profound effect on voter perceptions of the participants.⁸⁰ By conducting increasingly numerous primary debates, the media have the potential to alter voters’ perceptions about a candidate’s viability and momentum.⁸¹ Inclusion in these events can be a boon to the viability of a marginal candidate, while exclusion can be devastating.

For instance, Gary Johnson, a popular former governor of New Mexico, waged an admittedly improbable bid for the 2012 Republican nomination. His extremely libertarian brand of republicanism was undeniably at odds with the majority of the Republican Party. Yet fellow libertarian Ron Paul had been considered a viable candidate as a relatively unknown commodity in the 2008 Republican primary. Furthermore, Johnson’s popularity in his home state of New Mexico gave him some reason for cautious optimism of at least being seen as a viable participant by virtue of being a “favorite son.” He was included in the first of the Republican debates and quite candidly expressed some of his more radical political beliefs such as legalization of narcotics and complete lack of government restrictions on abortions, two positions that

are anathema to a typical Republican primary voter. One could plausibly argue that this ideological variance with his electorate would make Johnson's candidacy unworthy of inclusion amongst the major candidates. Yet Ron Paul's success in 2008 and 2012 with similar beliefs would seem to dispel this explanation. One must also remember this was many months before a single primary vote was cast, when a larger debate field would be more feasible and perhaps advisable. Nevertheless, Johnson was not invited to any subsequent debate and coverage of his campaign, already somewhat lackadaisical, fell dramatically.⁸² CNN, the sponsors of the first debate to exclude Johnson, reasoned that his low polling numbers disqualified him from inclusion in the field of debate candidates.⁸³ Yet they neglected to mention that they themselves had not even included Johnson's name in much of their own polling in the months leading up the debate.⁸⁴ Johnson's case demonstrates that the media's decision on the inclusion or exclusion of candidate becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy and is often based on pre-conceived visceral notions of the candidate. If a candidate cannot substantiate themselves enough to warrant attention, they will not likely receive any and will lose an invaluable opportunity to present themselves to the voting public.

A more explicit example of the media making a unilateral decision on a candidate's viability occurred during the 2004 Democratic primaries. In a debate hosted by ABC, host Ted Koppel rather pointedly asked three candidates on the fringe of viability, Dennis Kucinich, Carol Moseley Braun and Al Sharpton, whether their

nomination bids were mere “vanity campaigns.”⁸⁵ Kucinich in particular expressed his dismay at the question and strongly pushed back against assertions of his irrelevancy.⁸⁶ The following day, ABC withdrew its coverage of the trio’s campaigns.⁸⁷

PERSONAL SCRUTINY AND THE “SPOUSAL VETO” OF THE MITCH DANIELS CANDIDACY

The extremely intensive media coverage in the modern primary system is an essential ingredient in the potential benefits from participation in the primary process. But this exhaustive coverage also entails unparalleled scrutiny of candidates’ personal life. This scrutiny can take a profound toll upon the candidate themselves or upon their family. Despite the positive potential effects of the primary process, prospective candidates are still people with very personal considerations, sometimes considerations that are ultimately more important than being a presidential nominee or deriving the benefits of merely participating in the process.

A modern example of a plausible candidate who spurned the primary process is Mitch Daniels, the former Director of the Office of Management and Budget and Governor of Indiana, whom some encouraged to seek the Republican nomination in 2012. Daniels eventually declined, and speculation ran rampant that Daniels’ wife, Cheri, had exercised her “spousal veto” on the idea, fearing intense media speculation regarding their previous estrangement and subsequent reconciliation.⁸⁸

It is unclear whether this was the decisive factor in Daniels' decision or whether he ever intended to run for President at all. But it is instructive in that we should take care not to be too clinical in assessing the impact of a presidential bid upon an individual. In order to obtain the benefit of primary participation, a candidate must be willing to sacrifice extensive amounts of their time and their privacy and expose their loved ones to scrutiny and attention; for some, this is simply too high a price to pay. While it is sentimental and personal and difficult to quantify, this is a potential downside that should not be casually dismissed when considering a presidential bid.

THE MEDIA AS BENEFICIARIES OF THE SPECTACLE

The modern primary process relies upon the media to convey importance and attention upon it. But the length and intensity of the spectacle primary system also can be beneficial to the political media. The entire process now stretches its contests over the course of almost six months. In 2012, the first contest, the Iowa caucuses, took place on January 3rd, while the last, Utah's Republican primary, was held on June 26th.⁸⁹ While the outcome typically is not in doubt in June, this expanse of time allows the political media to function almost like a sports network covering a season. In the 2008 primary cycle that featured highly competitive races for both party's nomination, there were twenty-eight nights featuring at least one party's primary or caucus.⁹⁰ On each of these

nights, the cable news networks could devote much or all of their attention to the election replete with innumerable banks of analysts and commentators.

Since primary contests for the most part now have a direct impact upon the nomination competition, they are decidedly newsworthy events the media can use to attract viewers. In recent years this appears to be quite helpful to their short-term ratings. The major cable news networks, CNN, MSNBC and Fox News, experienced a year of “explosive audience growth” in 2008, up sixty-nine, eighty-two and forty percent respectively in average prime-time viewership compared to 2007.⁹¹ After the general election in November 2008, the networks lost fifty, forty-one and forty percent respectively of their audiences.⁹²

THE POLITICIAN / PUNDIT MUDDLE

In addition to their seemingly symbiotic relationship, the line between the media and the candidates they cover has become increasingly blurry in recent years. To fill their numberless banks of commentators, the media has invested heavily in former and perhaps future presidential candidates. A cyclical relationship has developed between the two, as political figures and media pundits have become somewhat interchangeable. This arrangement is mutually beneficial for the network and the potential candidates; the networks can draw viewers with an exclusive hold over a potential presidential candidate and the prospective candidates have not only a paying job, but also a forum

to increase their public profile whether they decide to seek the presidential nomination or not.⁹³ Fox News alone during the invisible primary employed five widely rumored potential candidates for the Republican nomination, affording them a significant advantage according to some of their rivals.⁹⁴

CNN meanwhile has been accused of providing such an effective platform for Wesley Clark to ingratiate himself to the American public that he was in essence “the presidential candidate CNN built.”⁹⁵ As a former NATO commander, CNN ensured that Clark was ubiquitous on their network to explain what was happening at the beginning of the Iraq War in 2003, appearing every day from March 19th to April 12th.⁹⁶ This amount of exposure to the public as a prestigious military mind was essentially free advertising, availing Clark of the expensive and time-consuming task of introducing himself to the vast majority of the country when he launched his presidential bid in 2004.⁹⁷

THE PERRY CAMPAIGN’S “OOPS”

Many might assume that a particularly unsuccessful or gaffe-filled campaign could expose the weakness or lack of aptitude of a candidate and leave them worse than before the experience. They could appear crazy, stupid or mean and tarnish an otherwise relatively good public profile. The combination of an increasingly rigorous electoral calendar and an increasingly omnipresent media would seem to make this

even more likely. Such was the case of Rick Perry, who entered the 2012 Republican primary with much fanfare as a strong conservative alternative to Mitt Romney. Yet Perry quickly began to disappoint, suffering through campaign gaffes and poor debate performances, most notably being unable to remember a key aspect of his government reform agenda and offering a sheepish “oops.”⁹⁸ Perry’s meteoric rise to conservative hero was only matched by his calamitous fall from grace and quick exit from the primary race with nothing to show for his effort but a sullied reputation.

One might think that prospective candidates should take heed of Perry’s example, as it would appear that a less substantial candidate can suffer in the trial by fire of a primary cycle. But Perry’s example increasingly seems like the exception rather than the rule, and seems to be a result of poor preparation and “unforced errors” on Perry’s part rather than a reflection of a highly scrutinizing system. Nor does it appear that the damage to his reputation was so bad as to preclude future forays into presidential politics as Perry ponders launching a bid for the 2016 nomination.⁹⁹

PURVEYORS OF ENTERTAINMENT NOT STRINGENT EXAMINATION

Despite his embarrassment, Perry’s fortunes have not been irrevocably damaged because the modern spectacle primary is not conducive to rigorous investigation of a candidate’s merits. This is because the media, who present the spectacle primary to the

public, are far more concerned with their own self-interest than being exacting inquisitors. Whether this is readership or ratings or site visits, the richness and depth of media organization's political coverage is at best a secondary concern. Indeed, one could plausibly make the argument that in delivering perfunctory political information the media is merely delivering what the public wants. While audiences claim they desire more substantial debate topics, the ratings indicate that fewer people watch when more substantial questions are featured.¹⁰⁰ This environment of vapid political coverage can reduce the cost of entry for candidates because a media primarily interested in entertainment is largely content to traffic in insubstantial coverage with broad appeal. Therefore they are far less likely to thoroughly scrutinize candidates and reveal their contradictions or absurdities.

THE CONFLUENCE OF PRIMARY REFORM AND MEDIA EXPANSION

The contemporaneous development of the spectacle primary system and the modern political media have created an environment rife with ever-increasing opportunities for participants in the presidential primaries. The current primary system is an extraordinarily lengthy process, made important by its direct impact on the outcome of the nomination race and its ceaseless coverage by the media. It is a peerless arena for candidates to present themselves to the public and garner their attention and

esteem. Without both of these essential elements, candidates would have few foreseeable opportunities for personal gain from participation in a presidential primary alone.

Chapter III - Typology

THE VIABLE PARTICIPANTS AND TYPOLOGY METHODOLOGY

THE SIMILARITIES OF PRECEDING CAREERS

Applying the standard for viability mentioned above, sixty-two unsuccessful primary participants emerge from 1976-2008. The vast majority have traced remarkably similar career paths preceding their nomination bids. While any native-born American citizen over the age of thirty-five is eligible to run for President, understandably most who do so have previously attained major elected office on the federal or state level. The most common previous governmental jobs amongst viable primary participants are member of the House of Representatives, Senator or Governor.

An ubiquitous common thread amongst them is the legal profession; almost all of the sixty-two candidates at one point in their careers worked as an attorney or attended law school. For many, the legal profession acts as a convenient means of making money during interludes between elected offices or after their retirement from public life. Another remarkably common field for former presidential candidates is the academic field. Many former primary participants have advanced degrees in political science or economics or law, but they are not required for a candidate to make use of their practical political experience to find employment as at least a visiting professor.

Some, such as Fred Harris, have maintained long-term positions in academia; he has been a professor of political science at the University of New Mexico for thirty-seven years. The more common path is epitomized by John Anderson, who taught in seven different positions in seventeen years after his unsuccessful attempt at the Republican nomination in 1980.

CANDIDATE TRICHOTOMY

All of the candidate employment before a primary bid can be broken down into a rough trichotomy: candidates who are serving major elected officeholders, those who are former major elected officeholders and those who had not held elected office. What this work is primarily interested in, however, is the personal outcomes of these candidates after their primary bids in order to understand the effect of their primary participation. Here the population has more variance, making it difficult to categorize quite as neatly as preceding career arcs. But here too we can create a broad trichotomy of candidate subsequent career outcomes: those with careers primarily in the public sector, those with careers primarily in the private sector, and those with no apparent significant careers.

Categorizing the candidates in this way yields eight distinct typologies of candidates.¹⁰¹ Each group is named for a member who roughly typifies the preceding

Figure 3.1

Candidate Typology

	Primarily Public		Primarily Private	None Apparent
	The Kennedy Group		The Dodd Group	The Edwards/Hunter Group
Serving Congressmen/ Senators/ Governors	Bayh, Birch	Kemp, Jack	Church, Frank	Edwards, John
	Bentsen, Lloyd	Simon, Paul	Anderson, John B.	Hunter, Duncan
	Byrd, Robert	Harkin, Tom	Baker, Howard	
	Humphrey, Hubert	Alexander, Lamar	Kerrey, Bob	
	Jackson, Scoop	Lugar, Richard	Gramm, Phil	
	Udall, Mo	McCain, John	Dodd, Chris	
	Wallace, George	Lieberman, Joe	Richardson, Bill	
	Crane, Phil	Biden, Joe	Hart, Gary	
	Kennedy, Edward	Clinton, Hillary	Gephardt, Dick	
	Cranston, Alan	Paul, Ron		
	Glenn, John	Brown, Jerry		
	Dole, Bob	Kucinich, Dennis		
Gore, Al				
Former Congressmen/ Senators/ Governors/ Mayors	The Reagan/Bush Group		The Huckabee Group	The Gravel/Tsongas Group
	Reagan, Ronald Bush, George H. W.		Harris, Fred	Gravel, Mike
			Connally, John	Tsongas, Paul
			McGovern, George	
			du Pont, Pete	
			Bradley, Bill	
			Braun, Carol Moselsy	
			Dean, Howard	
			Giuliani, Rudy	
			Huckabee, Mike	
		Thompson, Fred		
		Romney, Mitt		
Hadn't Held Elected Office			The Buchanan Group	The LaRouche/ McCormack
			Shriver, Sargent	LaRouche, Lyndon
			Robertson, Pat	McCormack, Ellen
			Bauer, Gary	
			Clark, Wesley	
			Sharpton, Al	
			Jackson, Jesse	
			Buchanan, Pat	
			Forbes, Steve	
Keyes, Alan				

Left column is the candidate's career prior to their presidential bid, the top row is career after bid. For methodology, see above

and subsequent careers of the group as a whole. First we begin with candidates who were serving Congressmen, Senators or Governors at the time of their presidential run.

THE GROUPS

THE TED KENNEDY GROUP

This largest type of candidates follow the most traditional career arc whereby they seek their party's presidential nomination only after establishing themselves as major elected officeholders. Following their failure to garner the nomination, these candidates have largely stayed in governmental positions of one form or another for the rest of their careers. Many of them, especially in earlier historical electoral cycles, returned to their Senate seat and served there for some time without ever again appearing in presidential contests or on a presidential ticket.

Edward Kennedy is a good exemplar of this group as a whole. The unlikely patriarch of the Kennedy family was elected to the Senate in 1962, overcoming the contention that his family name was his only real asset.¹⁰² Kennedy remained in the Senate for some time, ultimately declining to run for president in 1972 and 1976 despite massive pressure to do so following the deaths of his brothers John F. Kennedy and Robert F. Kennedy.¹⁰³ But in 1980, he took the highly unusual step of challenging the sitting president in a primary, hoping to oust Jimmy Carter as the Democratic presidential candidate. Despite Carter's unpopularity, Kennedy was ultimately

unsuccessful in this endeavor and returned to the Senate, where he remained for the next twenty-nine years until his death in 2009. There are many other similar examples in this large group, though most had far less memorable forays into presidential politics than Kennedy. Robert Byrd, Richard Lugar and Tom Harkin are similar primary entrants, long-serving Senate stalwarts venturing into presidential politics once before resolving to retain their legislative role for many years.

This would seem to indicate that perhaps many candidates see no appreciable benefit to their careers as a result of their failed presidential nomination bids. This is a possibility, but there is an equally plausible way of explaining these outcomes. A failed presidential nomination bid may help stabilize and fortify one's hold on their current office. For instance, it seems possible that the unsuccessful bids of lesser-known Senators somewhat earlier in their careers like Lugar and Harkin contributed to the endurance of their Senate careers. While their careers did not exactly advance, they maintained their highly prestigious elected office for some time when they otherwise may have not.

Furthermore, not all of the candidates in this group merely maintained their earlier positions in government. A sub-set of candidates, dissimilar from Kennedy, Byrd and Lugar, reappeared in later presidential election cycles. Six candidates in this group would later become presidential or vice-presidential nominees: Lloyd Bentsen, Bob Dole, Al Gore, Jack Kemp, John McCain and Joe Biden. This subset has very similar

preceding careers as the “Senate stalwarts” sub-group, indeed each of these six served in the Senate. But their successful advance later in their careers to their party’s presidential ticket could indicate that perhaps having previously run for President can be beneficial to one’s later political career.

In this list in general, and especially amongst the subset of “Senate stalwarts,” a disproportionate amount of candidates emerge from earlier in electoral history. Only seven candidates who ran for President in 1996 and after fit in this group and of those seven, four did return indefinitely to their previous public jobs but the other three, John McCain, Joe Biden and Hillary Clinton, have all advanced to a presidential ticket or a cabinet post following their unsuccessful nomination bids. The tendency of more recent candidates to ply their trade in the private sector and the advancement of those who stayed in public life seems to indicate that the trend of nomination campaigns being beneficial is increasing over time.

THE DODD GROUP

A smaller group of candidates, nine of the total sixty-two, followed similar preceding career paths as their colleagues in the Kennedy group. But these candidates pursued their careers after their nomination bid principally outside of government. They have had diverse employment including running the New School in NY, CEO of

the MPAA, contributor to Fox News, creating one's own lobbying firm and of course the omnipresent legal profession (see Appendix A for more specifics).

There seem to be few differences between these candidates and the Kennedy group to explain their pursuit of private employment. We cannot know conclusively, but it seems likely that similar private sector opportunities would be available to those of the Kennedy group if they had chosen that path rather than maintaining or advancing their governmental careers. Many of these candidates made their presidential bids towards the end of their careers, though not necessarily later in their lives.

Chris Dodd is a good example of the members of this group. Dodd had a similar preceding career path as many of the members of the Kennedy group. In fact the resemblance between Dodd and Joe Biden is pretty striking. They are almost the same age, both represented north-eastern states in the Senate, Biden for thirty-six years, Dodd for thirty, and they conducted relatively forgettable bids towards the end of their careers for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2008.

The crucial difference between the two is that Biden was selected as Obama's running mate and became Vice-President while Dodd returned to the Senate to finish his term, declined to seek reelection, and is now head of the MPAA with a reported salary of \$1.5 million.¹⁰⁴ If Obama had made a different choice and Biden were not Vice-

President, there is a strong possibility he too would have served out the rest of his term through 2014 and then retire with similar private sector opportunities as Dodd.

It is entirely possible that the candidates of this type were not denied a career in the public sector if they had wished it. Indeed, only one of the nine candidates, Frank Church, left the office he held when he ran for president due to electoral defeat.¹⁰⁵ Bill Richardson was term-limited from retaining the governorship of New Mexico and therefore obligated to leave. But the other seven voluntarily chose retirement from the public sector and employment in the private.

THE EDWARDS / HUNTER GROUP

A much smaller set of candidates, two of the total sixty-two candidates, were active political figures at the time of their run but had no career in government nor any discernible coherent one in the private sector after their presidential bids. However, both of these candidates participated in recent primary cycles and may still have a future in the political or private sector.

John Edwards is likely only in this category for legal reasons; even with his profile in tatters following his highly public affair and divorce from his now-deceased wife Elizabeth, Edwards would likely have returned to his quite lucrative legal profession or a lobbying position if he had not been occupied with defending himself

against legal charges and possible imprisonment since his last attempt to win the presidential nomination in 2008.

It is less clear why Duncan Hunter has not at least ostensibly parlayed his Congressional service and presidential run into a new career opportunity in the public or private sector. He has spent significant time supporting the ultimately successful candidacy of his son to take over his old Congressional seat. Perhaps time will change his status but as of now he does not properly fit in either category. While a majority of candidates serve in public office at the time of their presidential run, a smaller but significant amount of candidates have formerly held such positions and reintegrate themselves into politics through the presidential primary.

THE REAGAN / BUSH GROUP

A very small amount of candidates, two of the total sixty-two, unsuccessfully sought the presidency as former major officeholders and subsequently returned to a largely public career. These two candidates, Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, returned to public life through the presidency in later electoral cycles. Reagan had left office as Governor of California shortly before his first foray into the primary process in 1976. Reagan was nominated for President in the next primary cycle in 1980 and was successful in the general election.

George H. W. Bush had left Congress almost a decade before his first presidential bid in 1980 and had occupied various posts in the executive branch until the beginning of the Jimmy Carter administration. Following the two-term presidency of Ronald Reagan and eight years as his vice-president, Bush was himself nominated and elected President in 1988.

THE HUCKABEE GROUP

While Reagan and Bush were ultimately successful in their presidential aspirations, not a single other former major elected office-holder candidate attained any public post after their presidential bid. In fact, the vast majority of former major elected-official candidates returned to the private sector after their primary defeat; eleven of the total sixty-two candidates fit this description.

Mike Huckabee is a good example of this type of candidate. Huckabee served as Governor of Arkansas from 1996 until 2007, announcing his intention to run for president not long after his departure as governor. While not attaining the Republican presidential nomination, Huckabee did rather well in his presidential bid and shortly thereafter secured a relatively lucrative job with Fox News.

The trend of this group towards private sector careers stands in stark contrast to the long list of serving candidates who maintain primarily public careers after their presidential bids. This disparity makes intuitive sense; unlike their serving

counterparts, unsuccessful candidates in presidential nomination contests who are not still actively in government have no elected office to fall back to. Still, it seems somewhat strange that not a single former elected officeholder candidate has returned to public life except those two who successfully secured the presidency.

It is unclear whether they have voluntarily chosen to remain outside of public life or if the benefits of participation in the primary process do not extend to being elected to public office after one's presidential bid. It would seem that these candidates with typically relatively high name-recognition would be able to secure positions in the House of Representatives or perhaps even the Senate if they wanted. It seems likely that they instead prefer their newfound private careers to a return to the lower rungs of public employment.

THE GRAVEL / TSONGAS GROUP

Two former presidential candidates, Mike Gravel and Paul Tsongas, comprise the very small group of former major elected officeholder candidates who have had no discernible private or public careers since their presidential bid. Paul Tsongas had few opportunities to cultivate any type of career after his presidential bid because he tragically died of cancer about four years after his presidential bid.

Mike Gravel pursued a rather bizarre presidential campaign in 2008 and subsequently has apparently been filling his time with quite eclectic pursuits. After his

withdrawal from the Democratic primaries in early 2008, Gravel switched to the Libertarian Party, has defended a Palestinian-American activist, publicly defended Sarah Palin, and become quite active in a the “9/11 truth & justice movement,” with one part of that movement now accusing him of absconding with some of the organization’s money in early 2010.¹⁰⁶ While it is obviously a small sample size, it seems plausible that Gravel’s unorthodox presidential campaign did not benefit him personally nor the health of his movement and ideology. However, Gravel only barely met the threshold of viability in his campaign, and this lack of ostensible benefit may be a function of this lack of visibility. Furthermore, if Gravel does in fact has a coherent ideology to advance, it is a difficult one to discern.

Despite his oddities, Gravel was a somewhat traditionalist candidate at least in background because he had been a Senator from Alaska before his presidential run in 2008. The vast majority of viable presidential candidates fit this intuitive mold of a current or former major elected officeholder. Yet some candidates have emerged onto the presidential scene without ever before holding elected office.

It appears that running for a president as an “outsider” candidate who had never before held public office can yield benefits in the private sector but not in the public sector. No candidate who had not previously held major elected office has pursued a primarily public career afterwards. It is not clear whether this is a choice of the candidates, who may not be interested in public careers, or perhaps the benefit they

derived from the presidential primary process does not lend itself to helping them be elected when they never have before. In any event, it appears candidates cannot or will not “jump the ladder” by running for president to set up a career of service in a lower elected position. Rather than lives primarily spent in public service, these kind of candidates largely return to the private sector for employment.

THE BUCHANAN GROUP

While the majority of presidential candidates have previously held elected office, it is by no means required for a candidate to establish themselves as viable and reap the benefits of primary participation. Nine such candidates had never held elected office but nevertheless later emerged as viable candidates for the presidential nomination. None of these candidates had traditionally political backgrounds before or since their failed presidential candidacy. The two closest candidates with political backgrounds are Sargent Shriver and Alan Keyes, since they had both previously served relatively minor roles in the executive branch. Wesley Clark had an undeniable public career background as a high-ranking military officer, but a position in the military is an wholly different experience than being an elected officer of the government.

Some of the candidates derive from a background of fervent religious and social advocacy, such as Pat Robertson, Gary Bauer, Al Sharpton and Jesse Jackson. Each of these candidates are themselves members of the clergy or have had close ties with

religious organizations. Jesse Jackson was the most serious of these candidates, emerging as a very plausible nominee for the Democratic Party in 1984 and 1988. The other three were far less plausible candidates, who likely entered the presidential primaries in order to bolster public attention of their most cherished issues rather than harboring legitimate beliefs that they would garner their party's nomination.

Since these candidates have had no previous electoral experience, it makes a good deal of sense that they appear to have a somewhat more tenuous attachment to the major political parties. Two of these candidates, Pat Buchanan and Alan Keyes, not only sought the Republican presidential nomination but sought the presidency via a third party candidacy. Wesley Clark also reportedly equivocated on which party he would join when planning his entry into politics and was accused by some of choosing the Democratic Party only because it was the party with an open competition for its presidential nominee.¹⁰⁷ It seems safe to say that this type of candidate without previous experience in elected office is far more of an opportunist than the "Senate stalwart" type. This group of candidates with no previous experience in elected office and primarily private post-bid careers is not, however, the most quixotic type of candidate.

THE LAROCHE / MCCORMACK GROUP

The final group consists of only two candidates, both of whom exist on the furthestmost fringe of viability. Neither had political experience of any kind before their

presidential bids and neither have had any discernible public or private careers in a typical way since. Lyndon LaRouche has held no elected office and has not participated in the private sector in any traditional sense since his many presidential runs both as a Democrat and an Independent. Rather he is more interested it appears in consolidating and expanding his rather perplexing organization that bears a significant resemblance to a cult.

While LaRouche's presidential aspirations seem to be an exercise in indulging his own megalomania, Ellen McCormack's foray into presidential politics was fueled by her fervent idealism. She had never held a job in either the public or private sector and proudly trumpeted her status as a housewife when seeking the Democratic nomination for President in 1976 on a platform largely based upon her vehement opposition to abortion.¹⁰⁸ McCormack was relatively successful enough to qualify for federal matching funds, a result that so dismayed some critics, who alleged matching funds were never intended for single-issue candidacies, that the law was subsequently changed to raise the threshold for federal matching funds.¹⁰⁹ Despite raising an impressive amount of money, McCormack came nowhere close to capturing the nomination or even challenging the eventual winner Jimmy Carter. In fact, unlike some more recent quixotic outsider candidates, she never became very publicly renowned; her own next-door neighbor was reportedly unaware she was running for President.¹¹⁰ Yet her candidacy at the beginning of the post-reform primary era presaged the rise of

those presidential candidates with little electoral hope but with zealous belief in a single issue or a broader ideology.

OVERARCHING TRENDS

EXTRA-QUIXOTIC OUTSIDERS

From these groupings of candidates and their career outcomes, we can come to some general conclusions. Firstly, neither party has ever nominated a candidate for President without previously holding elected office; apart from Jesse Jackson's attempts in 1984 and 1988, no such candidate has even come close. Therefore these candidacies outwardly might appear to be unsuccessful compared to their compatriots of other types. Yet some of these candidacies are not necessarily failures because they did not succeed or come close to securing their party's nomination. The spectacle primary process offers the opportunity for exposure of not just candidates, but their ideologies.

These are the kind of politicians who pursue what can be termed "single-issue candidacies," political campaigns fixated upon the advocacy of a single policy. While the vast majority of these types of candidates exist on the furthest-most fringes of relevancy in a presidential primary, their failure can theoretically bring more attention to their cherished issue. Since 1976, there have been two clear "single-issue candidates" who have garnered enough support to cross the viability threshold, Ellen McCormack in 1976 and Gary Bauer in 2000. Both candidates focused their campaigns upon their

opposition to abortion, attempting to use the presidential nomination process to advance their viewpoint in the public mind. It is questionable however, whether they had any success in their endeavor to advance their ideas. These two candidates only barely passed the threshold of viability and have left a far from indelible mark upon electoral history.

RUN, THEN RUN AGAIN

Several of the viable candidates sought their party's presidential nomination in multiple election cycles. Some, like Ronald Reagan and Mitt Romney, were successful in their second attempt. But eleven others sought their party's nomination on multiple occasions and were never successful. Outsider candidates who had not previously held elected office are over-represented amongst these candidates; of the eleven "multiple runners," five of them are candidates with no previous experience in elected office.¹¹¹ Given that candidates with no previous experience with elected office in government tend to have very remote prospects of securing the nomination, it appears that outsider candidates are more willing to use their candidacy in the primaries as a vehicle for their other aspirations.

NEGLIGIBLE ABSOLUTE CAREER RISK

It seems logical that participation in the primary system does not benefit each candidate equally. And indeed there is a wide amount of variance in post-bid outcomes for candidates both between and within the candidate types. But almost all of the candidates, fifty-six of the total sixty-two, had a discernible post-bid career either in the public or the private sector. There are reasonable explanations for the remaining six's lack of careers, ranging from criminal indictment to untimely death.

The worst case scenario of participating in a presidential primary does not appear to be bad as one might assume. It is possible that a poor primary performance can do some damage to one's reputation, but it is extremely rare that it does such irreparable damage that it will preclude a failed candidate from pursuing a worthwhile subsequent career. Even candidates who barely established themselves as viable participants in the primary had jobs of one kind or another. Especially in the private sector, the historical record demonstrates that there are extensive and diverse opportunities for a former presidential candidate of any type.

Figure 3.2

Candidate Career Change Over Time

	Period	Primarily Public	Primarily Private	None Apparent
Serving Congressmen/ Senators/Governors	76-'88	16	5	0
	'92-'08	9	4	2
Former Congressmen/Senators/ Governors/Mayors	76-'88	2	3	0
	'92-'08	0	8	2
Hadn't Held Elected Office	76-'88	0	3	1
	'92-'08	0	6	1
TOTALS	76-'88	18	11	1
	'92-'08	9	18	5

Left column is the candidate's career prior to their presidential bid, the

FROM PUBLIC POST-RUN CAREERS TO PRIVATE

Given the continued evolution of the spectacle primary from 1976 to the present, it is possible that the candidates participating in these primaries have changed as well over time. If one splits the candidates roughly in half by the time they ran for President¹¹², what results is a early period (1976-1988) with thirty candidates and a later period (1992-2008) with thirty-two candidates. There is a small difference in the preceding career arcs of the viable primary participants; in the early period twenty-one candidates were serving major elected officeholders, compared to fifteen in the later period and five candidates from the early period were major former elected officeholders, compared to ten in the later period.

But while the preceding career types appear to have not significantly changed over time, there is a more clear difference in the post-primary outcomes of the

candidates between periods. In the earlier period, eighteen candidates returned to the public sector after their failed primary candidacies, while nine pursued a career mainly in the private sector. In the later period, this trend has almost reversed itself, as eleven candidates have largely remained in government and eighteen have left for private employment.

These findings appear to indicate that a gradual historical shift is taking place in tandem with the evolution of the spectacle primary. While the spectacle primary system offers the potential for benefits in the private or public sectors, an increasing amount of the viable candidates in each primary cycle are seeking to apply these advantages in the private sector rather than the public. Why this is occurring is unclear, but it is a trend that seems to be continuing in the most recent electoral cycle in 2012, as only two of the viable participants in the Republican nomination presently work in the public sector.

Chapter IV - The Private Sector

GROWING PSEUDO-POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES OUTSIDE OF GOVERNMENT

Should a failed primary candidate not be able or not wish to continue their life in politics, their status as a former presidential candidate will serve them well in securing gainful employment in the private sector. Far from being forced into an early retirement, unsuccessful primary candidates have an ample opportunity for robust private careers.

As mentioned above, an increasing amount of primary entrants over time have entered the private sector following their primary bid, perhaps because the spectacle primary continues to evolve and offer ever-increasing chances for its participants to bolster their public profile. But in addition to the process lending itself increasingly to private sector post-bid employment, the number of opportunities have increased because since the 1970s there has been a marked growth in the “pseudo-political” part of the private sector. While these kinds of jobs are not in government, they interact with the political process and owe their existence to it. In some cases, an applicant’s reputation is a better a job qualification than actual aptitude.

Positions in lobbying firms, in the media as pundits, in think-tanks and in law firms are abundant in the Washington area. These types of jobs offer an immediate venue for former presidential candidates to exploit their fame and persona for personal gain. From the prospective of these organizations, it makes sense to hire well-known

lobbyists whose reputation will result in public attention or the successful convincing of political figures. Former presidential candidates offer a natural choice in this regard and the historical record indicates that a considerable amount of candidates who immediately leave public life take up this kind of employment. However, these types of jobs are not the only means for a candidate to benefit themselves in the private sector. As the opportunities have increased in number, they have also diversified in kind.

WESLEY CLARK'S SOJOURN IN POLITICS

One way to try to isolate the effect of primary participation as much as possible is to remove previous government service as the principal explanatory variable for a former primary entrant being well-suited to outside employment. We can do this by looking at a candidate who did not in fact ever hold elected office before their failed presidential bid. Very few people have become viable candidates for a major party's presidential nomination without previously holding major public office. Perhaps the most cogent is a recent example, General Wesley Clark, who sought the Democratic nomination for President in 2004. Clark was somewhat well-known as a military figure; he had been a relatively high-profile commanding general of NATO during its involvement in the Yugoslavian Wars of the 1990s. His potential entry into politics was marked with substantial buildup and much speculation about his political beliefs and party preference; Clark eventually declared his allegiance for the Democratic Party.¹¹³

Media and popular reaction were initially quite ebullient and some saw Clark as a present-day Eisenhower.¹¹⁴

Yet Clark was ultimately unable to secure the Democratic presidential nomination, finishing fourth in the national primary vote behind eventual nominee John Kerry, John Edwards and Howard Dean. Clark's late entry, fundraising deficit and some concerns about his readiness for the job without any political experience conspired to doom his candidacy. Clark won only a single primary contest, Oklahoma, and his campaign was largely seen as a disappointment. But crucially, the media had initially been infatuated with Clark and his public profile was far higher than it had been before his foray into the presidential nomination process.

During the interlude between his retirement as NATO commander and his presidential bid, Clark had found employment as a "corporate consultant" for the Stephens Group, a holding company owned by a family from Clark's hometown of Little Rock, Arkansas.¹¹⁵ His compensation is not public, but we can infer that he likely was relatively well-paid. But since his presidential bid and the exposure it bestowed upon him, Clark has experienced much greater personal success; he has founded his own lobbying firm, Wesley K. Clark & Associates, about which little information is public except that Clark draws upon his "expertise, relationships, and extensive international experience" to advance the interests of his clients.¹¹⁶ In addition, he has served as Vice Chairman and Senior Advisor to James Lee Witt Associates LLC, an

emergency readiness and response corporation.¹¹⁷ He also serves as a member on the Board of Advisors for Geooptics LLC, an environmental data delivery company¹¹⁸ and serves as co-Chairman of Growth Energy, an organization who “represent the producers and supporters of ethanol.”¹¹⁹ In a more definitive demonstration of his public visibility, Clark was selected in 2012 to host a NBC program called “Stars Earn Stripes,” wherein he draws upon his military background to help shepherd celebrities through mock military missions.¹²⁰

Clark’s career prospects markedly improved following his presidential run compared to his brief career after his retirement from the military but before his primary bid. He went from relatively low-profile employment as a “corporate consultant” to a correspondent for CNN while rumors swirled about his potential candidacy, to being involved in three private companies, one of which he founded and owns, and hosting a high-profile show on television after his unsuccessful bid. Despite this lack of electoral experience, Clark was able to parlay his failed primary bid into a diverse private career.

MIKE HUCKABEE’S “REALLY, REALLY, WONDERFUL...FOX GIG”

While Clark had never held elected office, he was relatively famous for a career solidier as the former head of NATO and for his extensive appearances on cable television. Mike Huckabee, on the other hand, was not known widely at a national level at all at the conclusion of tenure as Governor of Arkansas in 2007. To be sure, he was

well-respected in his home state, but his national exposure was mostly limited to interest in his dramatic weight loss.¹²¹

Almost immediately after his departure as governor of Arkansas, Huckabee launched a bid for the 2008 Republican presidential nomination. He ran as a social conservative and had a good degree of success, capturing the Iowa caucuses and some southern primaries while emerging as the principal alternative to John McCain after the withdrawal of Mitt Romney. His charisma, impeccable conservative credentials and surprisingly strong showing made many wonder after McCain's defeat if Huckabee would be the Republican standard-bearer in 2012.

Huckabee quickly translated his newfound political celebrity into apolitical employment by taking a position in the media. As discussed earlier, media coverage of the primary process has moved inexorably upward. The advent and evolution of cable television in particular has created far more positions than in the earlier television era exclusively dominated by network news programs.

Shortly after his withdrawal from the presidential nomination race, Huckabee was hired by one of these cable news organizations, Fox News, as a contributor. This alone is not an overly remarkable accomplishment for a national political figure. But not long thereafter, Fox News made a far more substantial investment by airing *Huckabee*, a weekly show hosted by its namesake. *Huckabee* became and remains a successful program, earning its host a reported annual salary of around a half a million dollars, in

addition to the radio work Huckabee has been performing for Citadel Media.¹²² This income has allowed Huckabee to reportedly begin building a multi-million dollar vacation home in Florida.¹²³

As the 2012 Republican primary field began to take shape, Huckabee seemed like a natural candidate given his strong showing in 2008, continued popularity, and ability to retain an audience in the media. But Huckabee in the end demurred, saying, “all the factors say go, but my heart says no.”¹²⁴ This decision was not a surprise to some political commentators given Huckabee’s effusive appreciation for his job on Fox News in an interview with Chris Wallace in 2009, saying specifically about his presidential decision, “the reason I wouldn’t is because this Fox gig I’ve got right now, Chris, is really, really, wonderful.”¹²⁵ He was even more explicit about his personal financial considerations in a February 2011 conversation with reporters when he declared, “I need to make sure I’m ready to give up my job to declare my candidacy. The day I say, ‘I’m running,’ that’s the day I don’t have an income.”¹²⁶

It is unclear if Huckabee simply was uninterested in becoming President or if he believed the risk to his personal finances was not worth the potential reward of the presidency. In any event, Mike Huckabee provides us with an albeit anecdotal but also quite telling example of the opportunities available to a candidate despite not attaining any elected office since the end of his governorship. Because while Huckabee failed in his attempt to win the Republican nomination for President in 2008, his relatively good

showing and the positive reception of his attempt yielded an impressive private sector career, one too good it appears for Huckabee to give up.

TIM PAWLNTY'S EPHEMERAL CANDIDACY BUT ENDURING PERSONAL SUCCESS

While Mike Huckabee waged a long campaign in 2008 and emerged as a serious challenger to the eventual nominee John McCain, Tim Pawlenty's attempt to secure the 2012 Republican nomination was remarkable for its brevity and lack of success. Pawlenty was rumored as a possible candidate in 2008 but opted out of the contest. He did launch a bid for the 2012 nomination in early 2011, resplendent with high production-value campaign ads and the promise of his rumored candidacy in the previous election cycle.¹²⁷

Pawlenty's campaign however could not match the presumptions of his campaign ads. He placed enormous importance on his performance in the Ames Straw Poll in August 2011, almost six months before the first primary contest. While ostensibly a kind of early snap poll of prospective voters in the vital early-voting state of Iowa, the Ames Straw Poll is in reality a somewhat farcical exercise that involves the essential purchasing of votes by candidates. Michelle Bachmann's victory in 2012 coupled with low-turnout convinced some Republicans that the event needed to be seriously reformed or abandoned entirely.¹²⁸ Yet the outcome had a profound and deleterious effect upon Pawlenty, who had invested extensive resources and created great

expectations for victory in the straw poll. His failure to do so coupled with his already relatively weak national position meant that Bachmann's upset victory quickly became the *coup de grace* for Pawlenty's campaign. Upon his withdrawal, Pawlenty endorsed Mitt Romney and later served as the national co-chairman of his campaign. As in 2008, Pawlenty was considered as a running mate, but was ultimately passed over.¹²⁹

Despite his lack of success and having withdrawn from the nomination process months before the first primary votes were cast, Pawlenty appears to have benefited from his nomination experience just as other more enduring and successful failed candidates had. As an early endorser of Mitt Romney, Pawlenty was rewarded with a position as national co-chair of the Romney campaign. Yet he resigned this position before the general election was over after receiving an enticing private employment offer. He had accepted a position as head of The Financial Service Roundtable, a bank lobbying group, for the lucrative reported salary of \$1.8 million.¹³⁰ It is possible that he would have received this offer as a simple former Governor of Minnesota, but it seems that his brief and rather disastrous foray into presidential politics was at least somewhat helpful in raising his public profile and may have helped him secure his new lucrative position.

THE SPEAKING CIRCUIT

Shortly after announcing his intention to seek the 2012 Republican nomination, Pawlenty came under some criticism for the release of an email by the agency representing him as a paid speaker.¹³¹ This email, sent to potential corporate employers, openly capitalized upon Pawlenty's new status as a presidential candidate and reiterated that he was nevertheless still available for paid speaking engagements.¹³² Pawlenty faced some recriminations because presidential candidates customarily suspend their speaking engagement careers during their candidacies.¹³³ However, without any formal job after leaving the Minnesota governorship, Pawlenty was apparently dependent upon his speaking engagement fees for income.¹³⁴ The reporter of the story even speculated that the presidential bid was being used to facilitate his speaking engagements rather than the other way around.¹³⁵

While the speaking engagement circuit is perhaps less well-known employment than something like lobbying, participation is quite commonplace amongst the more recent viable primary nominees. Following her departure from the State Department, Hillary Clinton almost immediately joined the Harry Walker Agency, a group representing many other prominent figures, including her husband former President Bill Clinton.¹³⁶ This is expected to be a very lucrative venture for Clinton, with her fees approaching or surpassing six figures, making her among the highest-paid speakers of all the agency's clients.¹³⁷ This makes sense given Clinton's celebrity as a former First Lady, Senator, presidential candidate and Secretary of State.

But this does not mean that the lecture circuit is closed to less famous former politicians. The Harry Walker agency alone represents Clinton and ten other viable primary candidates from the post-reform era.¹³⁸ Even Mike Gravel, whose post-bid career has been extremely obscure to the point of non-existent, is available for speaking engagements through Harry Walker.¹³⁹

The compensation for each person is not readily available, but it is a potentially lucrative avenue for former politicians to make some money with relatively little effort. Mitt Romney came under some criticism for dismissing his reported speaking fees of \$374,000 from February 2010 to February 2011 as “not very much.”¹⁴⁰ While this is a relatively inconsequential sum for someone of Romney’s wealth, it could be a valuable revenue stream for a self-interested candidate following their departure from public life.

And while the vast majority of politicians available for speaking engagements through Harry Walker are not former primary candidates, those that appear to make full use of this aspect of their biography. Alan Keyes’s profile for instance, proudly trumpets at the very top that Keyes is a “3-Time Republican Presidential Candidate.”¹⁴¹ Nor is Henry Walker the only purveyor of former presidential candidates to speak at any function willing to pay them. Another group, Leading Authorities, represents former candidates Bob Dole, Gary Hart, Pat Buchanan and Tim Pawlenty.¹⁴²

On the other hand, the sheer number of active and former political figures available for speaking engagements is staggering, and being a former presidential

nominee is by no means a prerequisite for inclusion in the group. Many candidates considering a presidential bid may already be sufficiently well-known to garner speaking engagements if they choose to pursue them. But judging by intuition and how eagerly the agencies trumpet the former presidential candidacies of some of their speakers, it would seem that being a former primary candidate can only help.

THE UBIQUITOUS POLITICAL BOOK

It is sometimes unclear whether a candidate is using their speaking appearances to advance their presidential aspirations or the reverse. There can be similar confusion when dealing with published books written by active or prospective presidential candidates. After the election is over, a candidate does not necessarily even have to rely upon being hired to capitalize upon their public visibility; a book is a relatively easy way to do so independently.

Printed books are also an interesting phenomenon because they can be both a cause and symptom of a successful campaign or public image. Books written by presidential candidates are a useful tool because they allow a candidate to increase their name recognition and their intellectual gravitas. But in addition, books can be a useful alternative means of income for candidates before, during and after elections, whether they are successful campaigns or not (see Appendix B for further details).

THE CAMPAIGN TOME

In recent times it seems like everyone has their own book, and presidential candidates in particular have been quite the prolific authors. Of the fourteen “viable” candidates in the 2008 Democratic and Republican primaries, half produced at least one written work during their campaign or immediately before, all taking the form of either a kind of political manifesto or more typically a rather self-serving autobiographical venture. A good example of this kind of material is Mitt Romney’s *Turnaround: Crisis, Leadership and the Olympic Games*, written in 2007. Even the decidedly more obscure candidate Mike Gravel produced *Citizen Power: A Mandate for Change* (2008). These “campaign books” are useful as tools to advance the candidacy of their author. But they also serve the practical benefit of earning money, albeit in some cases likely quite little, and sales will likely recede once the primary is over and the author is no longer in the public eye. These books would likely not have been written in the first place or if they were would have sold far fewer copies without the exposure of their author to the public through their pursuance of a presidential bid.

THE CASHING-IN BOOK

Perhaps even more prolific is the tendency for former presidential candidates to cash in on their experiences after their defeat. Of those same fourteen 2008 unsuccessful primary candidates, they have collectively published fifteen different books. Some, like Mitt Romney’s *No Apology: The Case for American Greatness* (2010) or Ron Paul’s *The*

Revolution (2009) were likely laying further groundwork for their eventual renewed presidential bids in 2012. Yet others, like *Teaching the Pig to Dance* (2010), penned by Fred Thompson, appear to be more a straightforward attempt to capitalize financially on his momentary rise in visibility as a result of his political campaign. It would seem that Thompson's memoir was far more plausible to be published in 2010 soon after his moment in the sun in 2008. On the other hand, Thompson's work was dismissed rather harshly by the Wall Street Journal who surmised from its content that Thompson had no intention of running for office again and the work appears not to have been a spectacular commercial success.¹⁴³ Yet Thompson did get it published and likely made some amount of money for his effort. Consensus opinion following Thompson's ill-fated 2008 presidential nomination bid was that he had damaged his public reputation rather than advanced it and yet he was still able to find a publisher for his memoir. We cannot know if he would have accomplished this as a mere former senator had he not run for President, but it seems likely that at the very least, his failed presidential bid and the added visibility it afforded him was a help rather than a hinderance.

SIMULTANEOUS PROMOTION OF SELF AND IDEAS

THE IDEOLOGICAL TREATISE

Published books also provide the opportunity for fervent believers in political theory or other causes to use their campaign visibility to increase the amount of people reading their works and thereby absorb their philosophy. Ron Paul is a quite cogent example of this phenomenon. Supporters and opponents will agree that Ron Paul is a fervent believer in libertarianism, an ideological framework that generally favors a dramatically reduced role for government in public life. Paul also considers himself an economic theorist, who sees himself as drawing heavily upon the economic theory of Friedrich von Hayek and others from the Austrian school of economics. Since 2007 alone, just before Paul rose to national prominence with his first bid for the Republican Party's presidential nomination, Paul has authored or co-authored eight different works. But unlike Fred Thompson's memoir, these are not filled with self-serving autobiographical anecdotes but collectively take the form of a relatively radical manifesto.

Paul had been the Libertarian candidate for President in 1988 but was a relatively unknown Congressman from Texas who was largely alienated from his own party due to his contrarian libertarian views on key issues. But after his ultimately unsuccessful bid for the Republican nomination in 2008, Paul became quite popular and well-known nationally. He himself noted that his candidacy and his books were not only an attempt

to win elected office, but also to use his candidacy as a vehicle to advance the libertarian movement by bringing to the fore issues of importance to him and his followers.¹⁴⁴ Published written works are a valuable tool for advancement because the varying motivations behind publishing books are not mutually exclusive; one can find benefits for their personal finances, their electoral future and the future of their ideology simultaneously.

SUPER PACS AS RELEVANCY VEHICLE

Books are not the only tool for the advancement of a political ideology or the promotion of a politician's public profile. The advent of Super PACs and general loosening of restrictions on money in politics has created new vehicles to exert political influence for anyone with money or the ability to shepherd it. Former presidential candidates who no longer hold an official public position are in an ideal position to take advantage of the system which allows an organization to seamlessly translate from "independently" promoting a candidate's presidential campaign to being an outlet and underwriter for their future political advocacy. These kinds of organizations create the possibility for a former candidate to translate their ephemeral relevancy in a nomination contest into the possible enduring influence of their ideas or continued role for themselves in the public debate.

The 2012 presidential election was the first to feature Super PACs. Super PACs are allowed to solicit unlimited funding provided that they follow the rather byzantine restrictions on direct “coordination” with individual candidates. In practice, this led to the creation of pseudo-official Super PACs for each presidential candidate in the 2012 primaries, often led in fact by former staffers or aides or other associates of a candidate. Despite ostensibly abiding by the restriction on coordination with the candidate, in practice these groups act largely in concert with their de facto sponsor candidate.

Like all the other major 2012 nomination candidates, Rick Santorum had a pseudo-official Super PAC; his was called the Red, White and Blue Fund. Despite their earlier protests to the contrary, this group will now concede that the organization was founded with the purpose of supporting Rick Santorum’s presidential campaign.¹⁴⁵ Upon his exit from the Republican nomination race, Santorum was able to combine his own strictly political organization, Rick Santorum for President, with the Red, White and Blue Fund.¹⁴⁶ This new kind of bifurcated organization can promote causes, cover Santorum’s expenses related to his advocacy and donate money to candidates Santorum supports.¹⁴⁷ In this way, the new political organizations can serve as both a bankroller of a former candidate’s post-election political lifestyle and an amplifier of their political beliefs and public profile. The money can be used to air issue-specific commercials and can allow Santorum to exert influence by channeling the money to candidates he supports in primary or general elections.

However, Santorum appears to be the only 2012 presidential candidate to make use of this opportunity. Many of the candidate-specific Super PACs now have no connection to their preferred candidate and if still active are clutching after some purpose following the presidential election.¹⁴⁸ Super PACs are such a new element in presidential politics that it is quite possible that future presidential candidates also decide to capitalize on this newly legal organizational chicanery.

Chapter V - The Public Sector

A large and increasing amount of unsuccessful presidential primary entrants have gone on to utilize the benefits of primary participation in the private sector. But what of the candidates who do not go on to ply their trade in the private sector? Is this a beneficial effect only applicable to those who leave government after their attempt at the presidential nomination?

While it is not always as recognizable as those who move to the private sector, those who stay on in government appear to also commonly benefit from their primary participation. And while an increasing number of former candidates over time have sought employment in the private sector, a plurality of primary participants since 1976 have spurned such usually more lucrative employment outside of government to maintain careers in the public sector after their presidential bid.

An unsuccessful presidential candidate might seem likely to be cast into the political wilderness after their primary defeat. And indeed, a defeat in a presidential primary can be symptomatic of a candidate's fundamental weakness and harbinger of declining future political outcomes. Yet the post-primary political prospects of a failed presidential candidate are not nearly as dire as one might expect. While they did not earn their party's nomination, a vast array of political possibilities remain that may not have been available had the candidate opted not to seek the presidential nomination in

the first place; opportunities ranging from low-level appointed positions in the government to the opportunity for seeking the presidential nomination again and this time being successful.

THE PREVIOUSLY-RUN ADVANTAGE

THE REPUBLICAN LINE OF SUCCESSION

One of the most striking trends that contradicts the notion that primary losers have harmed their future electoral prospects is the Republican Party's "line of succession"

for the presidential nomination. In the first post-reform Republican primary in 1976, Ronald Reagan mounted a robust challenge to sitting President Gerald Ford. Ford won a narrow victory, securing only 52.5 percent of the primary vote before being defeated in the general election by Jimmy Carter.¹⁴⁹ Four years later, in seeking a nominee to challenge then President Carter, the Republican party chose Reagan, the natural heir apparent to the party's presidential mantle. The Republicans would repeat the process of nominating the arguable runner-up from the previous competitive primary in every primary election since, with a lone exception in 2000 when they nominated the son of their previous successful nominee, not exactly an unknown commodity.

Figure 5.1

Post-Reform Republican Party Competitive Primary Contest Results

YEAR	NOMINEE	RUNNER-UP
1976	Gerald Ford	Ronald Reagan
1980	Ronald Reagan	George H.W. Bush
1988	George H.W. Bush	Bob Dole
1996	Bob Dole	Pat Buchanan
2000	George W. Bush	John McCain
2008	John McCain	Mitt Romney
2012	Mitt Romney	Rick Santorum

While Reagan appeared to be a strong candidate and the natural heir in 1980, he faced a strong challenge from George H.W. Bush, who capitalized on the new system in a very modern way, concentrating upon the early Iowa caucuses in an attempt to gain momentum and the eventual nomination.¹⁵⁰ Bush captured Iowa and seven other contests, before withdrawing from the presidential race and joining the Reagan ticket as his vice-presidential nominee. Reagan won reelection in 1984, leaving Bush, the incumbent Vice-President and former runner-up as the natural heir to the 1988 nomination. Yet Bush too was challenged by other figures, most notably by Senator Bob Dole, who captured the Iowa caucuses and won nineteen percent of the vote before his withdrawal. Bush won the Republican nomination and the general election in 1988 and as incumbent president unsuccessfully sought reelection as the Republican Party's nominee in 1992. In 1996, when seeking a nominee to challenge Democratic President Bill Clinton, the Republicans chose Bob Dole, the previous runner-up.

The 2000 election represents the only deviation from this model and even in this circumstance George W. Bush was far from a political outsider as the son of a former President. Finishing second to George W. Bush in 2000 was John McCain, who was nominated after a protracted primary battle in 2008, besting the second placed challenger, Mitt Romney. From the outset of the 2012 Republican primary process, Romney was seen as the front-runner despite his flaws. After facing a long list of possible alternatives, he too went on to secure the 2012 Republican presidential

nomination. In fact, the last Republican nominee who had not already served as President, ran for the presidency or was the son of a former President, was Barry Goldwater in 1964.

A FAILED CANDIDACY AS AN ASSET

The prevailing trend seems to demonstrate a powerful incentive for a prospective primary candidate to enter the race. It appears that Republicans like to nominate known-quantity candidates, and perhaps the easiest way to introduce and substantiate oneself is to pursue a campaign for the presidential nomination. At least amongst Republicans, a previous failed primary candidacy is not necessarily an encumbrance to future forays into presidential politics but maybe an advantage and perhaps a necessity.

This striking trend prompts one to wonder why a failed candidacy for the presidential nomination can be beneficial and a prerequisite for one party at least. It can be partially attributed to benefits of perception; a viable primary campaign entails media-generated exposure and raising of one's profile and prestige amongst the public and party elites. But crucially, there are more practical benefits that a candidate who had already sought their party's presidential nomination might enjoy should he or she run again.

THE REUSE OF ELECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Among the possible mechanisms at work is that it is far easier to reconstruct previous electoral infrastructure than it is to build it from scratch. Republican strategist Terry Nelson put it succinctly, “having run before for president puts you in a better place to run again.”¹⁵¹ National and state-level political operatives in primary races are in extremely high demand almost immediately after the conclusion of the previous election. Once and future candidates likely have more personal connections and familiarity with these operatives and therefore likely have the upper-hand in securing their services. These operatives have a vested interest in working for the eventual nominee and possibly can see a previous candidate with whom they are familiar as a more plausible candidate for the nomination and partner to work with.

Mitt Romney made extensive use of his previous unsuccessful presidential bid in 2008 when forming the electoral infrastructure for his 2012 run. He maintained previous campaign staff as paid employees of his “Super PAC,” allowing him to remain in pseudo-campaign mode throughout the gap between the 2008 general election and the beginning of the 2012 primary season.¹⁵² He also cultivated ongoing relationships amongst his former campaign staff, who met periodically.¹⁵³ In early primary voting states, especially New Hampshire, Romney retained the allegiance of many key senior staffers who had worked for him in 2008.¹⁵⁴ In effect, Romney had “a turn-key political apparatus in place and ready for deployment should he decide to run again.”¹⁵⁵ This is not to say that every previous candidate who seeks the presidency again will have such

readily useable campaign infrastructure; Romney appears to have consciously exerted himself to maintain his campaign organization. But it is an opportunity for a hard-working candidate to give their future electoral prospects a considerable benefit.

FAMILIARITY WITH THE KINGMAKERS

Another extremely important aspect of modern presidential campaigning is raising money, both directly through contributions to one's campaign or party, as well as through contributions to political organizations like "Super PACs." The most recent Republican presidential nomination contest demonstrated the increased power of outside political groups in the wake of the *Citizens United* decision. This new political landscape has created the possibility that not merely a small monied cadre of elites, but a single individual can exert great influence over a nomination contest. A previously unsuccessful candidate is likely to have more personal contact with these wealthy elites and be more likely to maintain a relationship with them between their unsuccessful primary and the next nomination contest.

A former unsuccessful nominee might also enjoy the crucial advantage of being familiar and perhaps thereby more acceptable to party elites. While the reforms of the primary system have decidedly shifted power away from party elites and to the party rank-and-file, elites still wield considerable power in determining the eventual

nominee. Fundraising as discussed above, is an important factor. But perhaps the more important expression of elite support is in the form of endorsements.

These public endorsements are a valuable political resource because they act as a important cue for primary voters.¹⁵⁶ Those attached to the party typically support the candidate with more elite support than those without it.¹⁵⁷ They can also be useful if the endorser is someone in a position of power or authority whose endorsement entails a tangible benefit, such as a governor or the head of a political organization.¹⁵⁸

DIMINISHING RETURNS FROM MULTIPLE CANDIDACIES?

This potential advantage suggests that a younger candidate considering postponing their presidential run until a later electoral cycle might be better served making their presidential bid immediately. There is however the risk that in so doing, a candidate could be perceived as stale and face diminishing returns in their future perhaps more plausible presidential run. Some evidence in the historical record indicates that candidates receive less electoral support their second or third time in a primary. Of the eleven viable candidates who ran in multiple primaries since 1976 and never were nominated, only three received a higher share of the popular primary vote on their second or third attempt.

But many of these are candidates who had no real chance of being nominated in the first place. For some of them like Lyndon LaRouche, declining levels of actual

electoral support is not as problematic as they would for a candidate with a more plausible chance at the nomination. As long as a more quixotic candidate can stay in the conversation of the primary, they have largely achieved their goals. And the electoral success of the five members of the Republican line of succession since 1976¹⁵⁹ further seem to indicate a smaller chance of declining electoral support amongst more plausible candidates in a second primary attempt.

THE PARTISAN DIVIDE

While all former viable primary candidates can experience political benefit from the process, the orderly succession of nominee phenomenon is particular to the Republican party. This disparity between the parties could be indicative of a fundamental

difference in the two party's selection methods and it also seems to be congruent with the intuitive perception of the Republican party. The Republican party historically has tended to be grounded in the ideas of caution, familiarity and an orderly progression of events and has had the reputation of being rather safe with its selections. The "line of succession" model they have consciously or unconsciously followed fits rather well with this paradigm. This idea is bolstered by the fact that until recently, Republican

Figure 5.2

Post-Reform Democratic Party
Competitive Primary Contest
Results

YEAR	NOMINEE	RUNNER-UP
1976	Jimmy Carter	Jerry Brown
1984	Walter Mondale	Gary Hart
1988	Michael Dukakais	Jesse Jackson
1992	Bill Clinton	Jerry Brown
2000	Al Gore	Bill Bradley
2004	John Kerry	John Edwards
2008	Barack Obama	Hillary Clinton

primaries tended to be less competitive and feature fewer viable candidates; a less chaotic and perhaps more controlled system that would seem more amenable to a familiar, proven candidate. It is also possible that because of the nature of the party, endorsements indicating elite support carry more weight in Republican races.

By contrast, the Democratic Party has not exhibited such a clear pattern in its nominations since the advent of the spectacle primary system. This too seems to fit the intuitive perception of the Democratic Party, which until recently had the reputation of being a loose amalgamation of disparate interest groups who have a difficult time settling on a candidate. Since Democratic candidates logically should receive the same practical benefits as their Republican counterparts, it would seem that the partisan disparity in the future presidential electoral prospects of former failed candidates is due either to simple chance or fundamental differences between the two parties in what they value in their candidates and how they make their selections.

In stark contrast to Republicans, candidates who have previously sought and failed to secure the Democratic Party's nomination have largely not been a major force in subsequent nomination contests. The seven Democratic runners-up had very little involvement in presidential electoral politics later in life apart from Jerry Brown, who finished second in 1976 and sought the nomination again in 1992 only to finish second yet again to Bill Clinton. While six of the eight Republican nominees since 1976 had

previously sought their party's nomination, only one of the seven Democratic nominees since 1976 have done so.

The one Democratic nominee who had already sought his party's nomination was Al Gore, who had finished third in the 1988 as a young Senator from Tennessee and then served as Vice-President during the Clinton administration. Gore's tenure as Vice-President certainly played a larger role in his nomination in 2000 than did his former candidacy. In any event, Bill Clinton's selection of Gore as a running mate in 1992 demonstrates a less striking but still noticeable alternative trend unique to the Democratic Party of choosing former primary participants as vice-presidential nominees.

THE PRIMARY CAMPAIGN AS A "STEPPING STONE"

SECOND PLACE MEANS SECOND BILLING?

Some academic literature asserts that the "stepping-stone" thesis, seeking a presidential nomination as the means to the vice-presidential nomination, while somewhat intuitive is historically incorrect.¹⁶⁰ Contrary to the idea explicitly put forth by Jesse Jackson after his second-place finish in the 1988 Democratic primaries, finishing second does not necessarily entail second billing on a presidential ticket.¹⁶¹ In fact, in the

rare instance that the vice-presidential nominee is drawn from the field of primary contenders, they are often a weaker rather than the stronger candidate.¹⁶²

There is some truth to these claims, but only in a very narrow sense. For the specific circumstance of Jesse Jackson in 1988, this appears to be an accurate assessment. But this does not disprove the “stepping-stone” thesis as a whole. While admittedly few presidential nominees select a primary opponent from the same electoral cycle, since that study’s publication, Jon Edwards and Joe Biden were both selected after participating in that primary cycle. And even if the effect is not immediate, participation in a presidential primary can act a long-term stepping stone to the vice-presidential nomination. Lloyd Bentsen and Jack Kemp epitomize this ability for former presidential candidates to reappear on a presidential ticket in later electoral cycles.

The other crucial point of this work demonstrates that if a presidential nominee selects a former primary opponent, they typically select a weaker candidate rather than their main rival. While this does contradict the “second-place, second billing” idea, it actually strengthens the impetus for a self-interested candidate who is vacillating upon an entry into the primary field because they are not confident in their ability to secure the nomination or even finish second. The crucial element to warrant consideration as a running mate is not necessarily a candidate’s overwhelming success as a primary contender, but merely their participation in the process.

THE ESTABLISHMENT DEMOCRATIC VP NOMINEES

In any event, it appears to be a phenomenon far more prevalent in the Democratic Party. Four of the seven Vice-Presidential nominees for the Democratic Party since 1976 have been candidates who had previously sought the party's nomination and lost. These four candidates, Joe Biden, Jon

Edwards, Al Gore and Lloyd Bentsen are also four of the last five Vice-Presidential nominees for the Democratic Party.

This pattern, much like the Republican line of succession, could be the result of simple chance; when dealing with such small numbers random patterns can emerge without significant underlying causes. But this phenomenon also suits an intuitive explanation given the character of the party. The Democrats have no line of succession, instead historically erring on the side of nominating relatively less experienced candidates than the Republicans. One of the main objectives for a nominee's vice presidential selection is to "balance the ticket," selecting a candidate with different geographic or ideological appeal or based on personal factors like age and experience. Thus it makes sense that Democrats, in nominating less established Presidential candidates, seek to nominate more established Vice-Presidents. Former candidates for

Figure 5.3

Democratic Party Presidential Tickets Since 1976

YEAR	Nominee	VP Nominee
1976	Jimmy Carter	Walter Mondale
1980	Jimmy Carter	Walter Mondale
1984	Walter Mondale	Geraldine Ferraro
1988	Michael Dukakis	Lloyd Bensten*
1992	Bill Clinton	Al Gore*
1996	Bill Clinton	Al Gore*
2000	Al Gore	Joe Lieberman
2004	John Kerry	Jon Edwards*
2008	Barack Obama	Joe Biden*
2012	Barack Obama	Joe Biden*

* Denotes a previous unsuccessful primary participant

president represent a logical body to draw upon for these kind of establishment figures. Perhaps the most instructive example of this phenomenon is the current Democratic executive tandem of Barack Obama and Joe Biden. When he was initially nominated, some within Obama's campaign and the Democratic Party believed that despite being perceived as something of a dull choice, Joe Biden, who had run for President in 1988 and then again in 2008, represented a solid choice that would assuage the concerns of working-class white Democrats and more traditionally centrist Democrats.¹⁶³ Biden was a quintessential "balancing" candidate whom even Obama himself reportedly was incredulous he had selected.¹⁶⁴ But if Obama were simply looking for a establishment figure within the Democratic Party he had many other options. Geographically, Biden had little to offer as his home state of Delaware has only three electoral votes and is already solidly Democratic. It seems likely that part of the reason for Biden's selection over other plausible vice-presidential candidates with more potential geographic advantages was his relative salience to the public and the party since his unremarkable campaign for President in 2008.

THE NEWCOMER REPUBLICAN VP NOMINEES

By contrast, the Republican Party tends to nominate more establishment figures for President and therefore has less need to choose a familiar candidate for vice-president to reassure their base or party elites. Only two of their vice-presidential

nominees out of seven, George H. W. Bush and Jack Kemp, had previously sought their party's nomination. These patterns are salient to the outcomes of failed presidential candidates because they offer an alternative to the notion that electorally speaking, a failed candidate has few future prospects.

Figure 5.4

Republican Party Presidential Tickets Since 1976

YEAR	PRES NOMINEE	VP NOMINEE
1976	Gerald Ford	Bob Dole
1980	Ronald Reagan	George H.W. Bush*
1984	Ronald Reagan	George H.W. Bush*
1988	George H.W. Bush	Dan Quayle
1992	George H.W. Bush	Dan Quayle
1996	Robert Dole	Jack Kemp*
2000	George W. Bush	Dick Cheney
2004	George W. Bush	Dick Cheney
2008	John McCain	Sarah Palin
2012	Mitt Romney	Paul Ryan

* Denotes a previous unsuccessful primary participant

NO ROOM IN THE CABINET

While previously unsuccessful primary candidates still have opportunities to contend for the presidential or the vice-presidential nomination in the future, they appear to have few prospects for employment lower in the executive branch. Of all the unsuccessful primary contenders from 1976 to the present, only two have later been appointed to a cabinet-level position. Lloyd Bentsen, who had unsuccessfully run for President and been nominated for Vice-President in 1988, was appointed as the Clinton administration's first Treasury Secretary in 1993. Following their tense primary battle, Barack Obama appointed Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State in 2008. Fellow 2008 candidate Bill Richardson was reportedly preliminarily chosen for the Commerce Secretary post but withdrew his candidacy due to an ongoing ethics investigation.¹⁶⁵ But these examples are the exception rather than the rule. Suffice to say, an aspiring

cabinet member likely has better avenues to their goal than challenging for the presidency against the eventual nominee.

There is scarcely more hope for unsuccessful presidential candidates further down the hierarchy of appointed executive positions. Walter Mondale and George McGovern found small niches within government as Ambassador to Japan and United States Ambassador to the United Nations Agencies for Food and Agriculture, respectively. Howard Baker eschewed the pure public service avenue and later became chief of staff for President Reagan.

Why is there such a dearth of presidential contenders, typically people in the upper echelon of national politics, in the executive branch? The reasons are somewhat unclear, but we can infer a few plausible answers. If a primary is particularly contentious or the two candidates are ideologically disparate, the eventual president may not want to follow President Lincoln's example and construct a "team of rivals." It also seems possible that cabinet positions are by their very nature more technocratic and therefore less suitable for an appointee from the legislative branch with little executive experience in the related field.

For instance, Lloyd Bentsen was appointed as the Treasury Secretary, largely on the strength of his service as Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. His predecessor at Treasury, Nicholas Brady, had also been a Senator. But none of the other eleven non-interim Treasury Secretaries to serve since 1976 have held any elected office

whatsoever. They are not formerly elected public servants, but rather financial policy-makers like Timothy Geithner or former CEOs of large corporations, especially financial institutions, like Robert Rubin and Hank Paulson.

The Secretary of State position tells a similar story. While Hillary Clinton was appointed by President Obama, her outcome was the exception rather than the rule. Of the eleven other Secretaries of State since 1976, only Edmund Muskie had unsuccessfully sought his party presidential nomination or indeed held elected office at all.¹⁶⁶¹⁶⁷ The Secretaries of State have typically spent most or all of their careers not in elected office but elsewhere in the public service, many in diplomatic positions or in other parts of the executive branch.

Apart from the presidential and vice-presidential futures of some former presidential candidates, there appears to be little hope for these primary participants in the executive branch. This is not to say that most unsuccessful presidential candidates have no future in government. But that future tends not to be in the executive but rather in the legislative branch from whence they have come. Many former presidential candidates, especially earlier in the history of the spectacle primary, simply returned to their previous jobs, primarily in the Senate and House of Representatives. While that may seem a paltry prize for a primary participant, as discussed above, this may help solidify their hold over their elected office.

Figure 5.5

Elected Official Presidential Candidates: When and How They Leave Their Seats

Serving Legislators/ Governors/Mayors	Primary Year	Last Year in Office	Defeated?	Serving Legislators/ Governors/Mayors	Primary Year	Last Year in Office	Defeated?
Anderson, John B.	1980	1980	No	Gramm, Phil	1996	2002	No
Baker, Howard	1980	1984	No	Harkin, Tom	1992	2014	No
Bayh, Birch	1976	1980	Yes	Hart, Gary	1984, 1988	1986	No
Bentsen, Lloyd	1976	1992	No	Humphrey, Hubert	1976	1978	No
Biden, Joe	2008	2008	No	Hunter, Duncan	2008	2008	No
Brown, Jerry	1976, 1980, 1992	1982	No	Jackson, Scoop	1976	1983	No
Byrd, Robert	1976	2010	No	Kemp, Jack	1988	1988	No
Church, Frank	1976	1980	Yes	Kennedy, Edward	1980	2009	No
Clinton, Hillary	2008	2008	No	Kerrey, Bob	1992	2000	No
Crane, Phil	1980	2004	Yes	Kucinich, Dennis	2004, 2008	2012	Yes ⁱⁱ
Cranston, Alan	1984	1992	No	Lieberman, Joe	2004	2012	No
Dodd, Chris	2008	2010	No	Lugar, Richard	1996	2012	Yes ⁱⁱ
Dole, Bob	1988	1996	No	McCain, John	2000	Current	No
Edwards, John	2004, 2008	2004	No	Paul, Ron	2008	2012	No
Gephardt, Dick	1988, 2004	2004	No	Richardson, Bill	2008	2010	No ⁱⁱⁱ
Glenn, John	1984	1998	No	Simon, Paul	1988	1996	No
Gore, Al	1988	1992	No	Wallace, George	1976	1978	No

Chart shows primary candidates who were elected officials when they ran for President, the year they unsuccessfully sought the presidency, their last year in their elected office, and whether their departure was due to electoral defeat

SITTING CANDIDATES KEEPING WHAT THEY HAVE

DO VOTERS PUNISH CANDIDATES WITH NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS?

One of the most straightforward potential risks a candidate who already holds elected office might consider is the prospect of losing their office whilst pursuing the

presidential nomination. Intuitively, this could result from a candidate's distraction from the minutiae of their state or district in their attendance to the rigors of a national race. But it can also result from a tribalist mentality amongst the electorate, believing a candidate seeking the presidential nomination might be "too good" for the simple citizens of their district or state and is too fixated on their personal higher aspirations.

Michelle Bachmann seemingly illustrates this potential problem rather well. Bachmann was first elected in 2006 and was reelected in 2008 and 2010 by an average of seven points.¹⁶⁸ She launched a bid for the 2012 Republican nomination, finding some initial success in the invisible primary. Yet her moment in the sun was brief, and after disappointing results in the earlier primaries, she withdrew quite early in order to concentrate on her reelection to the House of Representatives.

After averaging a margin of victory of 7% over her previous three elections, Bachmann barely secured her reelection in 2012 by two points. While 2012 was a presidential cycle and a harsh year for Republicans in general, Bachmann could plausibly have hoped for a better result. She had secured reelection in 2008 by three points with a lower public profile and accounting for only 58% of the total spending.¹⁶⁹ In 2012, her public profile was far higher, largely by virtue of her failed presidential run and she had accounted for 84% of total spending, outspending her Democratic opponent by \$9,666,848.¹⁷⁰

THE SAFETY OF THE LEGISLATURE

At first glance, this harmful effect seems broadly plausible and a potentially significant problem for the self-interested presidential primary candidate. But there is remarkably scant evidence of failed presidential candidates experiencing later electoral difficulties. Of the thirty-five candidates to seek their party's presidential nomination since 1976 who held elected office at the time, only five were later defeated in an election. Democrats Birch Bayh and Frank Church both ran for president in 1976 and lost their Senate reelection bids in 1980, a Republican wave year in which many Democratic incumbents were defeated. Republican Phil Crane was defeated in his bid for reelection to the House of Representatives, but only narrowly and in 2004, twenty-four years after his presidential nomination bid. The other two, Dennis Kucinich and Richard Lugar, were defeated in primary elections by their own party's voters in 2012.¹⁷¹ It would seem to strain causation to blame the losses of these last three on their failed presidential candidacies.

While a handful of candidates have lost and others have been reelected by smaller than typical margins, many viable primary candidates, and indeed many legislators in general, occupy quite safe elected seats. Even if a candidate experienced a modest decline in electoral support, the effect would more likely be winning reelection by fifteen instead by twenty points rather than losing when they otherwise would have won. Apart from the five candidates mentioned above, the other thirty candidates only left the elected office they occupied when they ran for the presidential nomination once

they had decided to retire or seek another office(see chart).¹⁷² There may be an element of selection bias; politicians who seek the presidency seem likely to be in a stronger political position than their colleagues as a whole. But it is also emblematic of the profound power of incumbency in the Senate and House of Representatives. In the two most recent Senate election cycles, only five elections featured an incumbent who sought reelection and failed.¹⁷³

The more typical example of the political course of former presidential candidates is epitomized not by Birch Bayh and Frank Church but another pair of Democratic senators, Robert Byrd and Ted Kennedy. These two contemporaries sought the Democratic Party's nomination for president in 1976 and 1980 respectively. While they were unsuccessful, the pair were reelected to their positions in the US Senate a combined ten times after their presidential bids and emerged as leaders of their party while serving until their deaths in 2010 and 2009 respectively.

The fear of losing one's position may seem most acute when a candidate is up for reelection contemporaneously with their Presidential nomination bid; all House members, a third of Senators and an indeterminate amount of Governors seeking the presidency would face this prospect. Yet most states do not force candidates to choose between seeking reelection to their lower office and seeking the presidency. There is some danger in seeking two offices simultaneously; the rigors of the presidential nomination campaign might cannibalize time and resources from the lower office

campaign and create disaffection in the voters of a candidate's state or district. But for the majority of candidates whose reelection is virtually assured, seeking their party's nomination even while simultaneously defending their current positions is a surprisingly low-risk proposition. Someone like Ron Paul, a House member from a relatively safe Republican district in Texas, likely faces minimal risk of reelection defeat whether they seek the presidency or not. For other candidates facing more contentious elections, the risk will likely be greater. But overall, the idea that one will seriously endanger their current office by seeking the presidency seems overblown. It may make logical sense, but it does not seem to bear itself out in the historical record.

Chapter VI - Conclusion

The fundamental contention of this thesis is that that the conventional primary calculation vastly over-estimates the costs and risks associated with a primary campaign. Simultaneously, it focuses too narrowly on actually securing the nomination and under-appreciates the value of ulterior benefits available to all viable participants. These benefits are made possible by the advent and evolution of the spectacle primary system, a mechanism for the selection of presidential nominees whose length and intensity offers innumerable opportunities for a participant to augment their public profile and garner valuable experience. The leviathan political media instills this process with importance and voraciously covers the process, allowing candidates to reach innumerable people they otherwise would not.

The confluence of these two factors has created an environment rife with practical and perception benefits, affording participants the opportunity to bolster their public image and gain valuable experience and connections for the future. A candidate can pursue non-political aims, angling to gain a position in the growing pseudo-political sector: as a pundit on television, in a lobbying firm or on the lecture circuit. They can try to maximize their exposure before leaving office to pursue employment in the private sector or use the presidential bid to maintain their relevancy while not in political office. Or a candidate can pursue further political benefits, laying the

groundwork for a more plausible presidential bid in the future or angling for selection as running mate or in the possible cabinet of the nominee. In short, the benefits one can possibly derive from participation in the primary process are quite diverse. A primary functions as a stage and a forum for participants to attempt to advance their subsequent careers.

THE CHANCES OF REFORM

THE PARALLEL PRIMARIES

The current primary system features two simultaneous but not necessarily mutually exclusive contests in each cycle: the nominative primary and the spectacle primary. The former fulfills the original purpose of a presidential primary; an intra-party contest between candidates to decide upon the optimal nominee. The other features its primary participants locked in competition for attention, experience or positive reception. These candidates are not so concerned with electoral results and instead are interested in using the process itself to maximize their own self-interest for other future endeavors.

The problem is that these two contests with very different goals must coexist within the same structure. Candidates who are mainly interested in self-aggrandizement are not restrained in their statements or policy positions by the need to appeal to a wider electorate in the general presidential election. This is advantageous

because they can make outrageous or overly simplistic statements that would not withstand intense scrutiny but are far more likely to generate exposure and attention than more nuanced positions held by candidates intent upon actually governing in the future. More simplistic and ideologically extreme statements and policy positions tend to be more viscerally appealing to primary voters, who in both parties tend to be more ideologically extreme than party members at large. For instance, Herman Cain promoted his extremely simple tax reform proposal to create nine percent individual income, business income and national sales taxes by simply saying “nine, nine, nine” at seemingly every opportunity. All of the candidates race one another to the ideological extremes, compelling potential governing candidates to shift their own policy positions to compete. This phenomenon can be seen in Mitt Romney’s transition from a former governor to a presidential candidate; he was compelled to shift his positions to the right on abortion, the environment, and immigration while imploring the conservative Republican base to see him as a “severely conservative” governor.

SATURATION OF THE SPECTACLE PRIMARY

The spectacle primary has grown to such a tremendous extent that we are approaching a saturation point. The invisible primary, the period of competition before any actual primary voting, is unlikely to grow any longer because it already essentially begins immediately following the conclusion of the previous presidential election.

Media outlets could feasibly start scheduling debates or other forms of campaign coverage even earlier than they already do, but given its extreme length already and some of the frustration voiced by party leaders following the grueling 2012 Republican primary, this seems unlikely.

REFORM STYMIED BY A SELF-INTERESTED RACE TO THE BOTTOM

However, it seems equally unlikely that the spectacle primary will contract in length or intensity in the foreseeable future. Things are unlikely to change because basically all of the major players involved in the creation of the spectacle primary benefit too much from its existence. The inability to reform or reduce the process is symptomatic of a “race to the bottom” or a kind of arms race, amongst all the self-interested players. Serious candidates seeking the nomination who are unwilling to begin the “invisible primary” as soon as possible will find that their competitors have already secured valuable electoral assets while they dallied. Media outlets are similarly compelled to maximize their coverage of the process; if they decide not to organize a debate because it is too early in the process or do not wish to sign a past or future presidential candidate as yet another contributor, one of their competitors likely will.

UNLIKELY PARTY INTERVENTION

In this kind of environment dominated by self-interest and lacking many structural rules, organic reform of the system is extremely unlikely. The only feasible way for the primary process to be shortened or refocused on its nominative purpose is the whole-scale imposition of control by the political parties. However, this too is unlikely because traditionally, much of the primary process is decentralized and lacks comprehensive top-down organization. In recent decades, parties have asserted more control over the process, but it seems improbable that the parties would assert the power necessary to fundamentally change the primary process. Parties too are trapped by the arms race nature of elections. Ideally, a long and well-covered primary process would be helpful to the party's eventual nominee by maximizing their exposure and demonstrating their aptitude for the presidency to the public. Should one party decide to truncate the process they may find that the other has gained the upper hand.

THE FUTURE OF THE SPECTACLE PRIMARY

AN UNEASY COEXISTENCE?

Fundamental reform of the process in the near future is quite unlikely. But one wonders whether the spectacle and nominative aspects of the primary process can coexist. It appears that while the spectacle is a troubling impediment, it does not pose an existential threat to the whole enterprise. There does not appear to be any evidence

that the sideshow of the primary process at the moment is injurious to the ultimate selection of nominees or the effectiveness of the eventual President in governing. The 2012 and 2008 Republican contests featured a good deal of not entirely serious candidates who received copious attention and were considered major candidates for the nomination, and yet those contests nominated two candidates, Mitt Romney and John McCain, who while unsuccessful in the general election, were still perhaps the best choices in a general election in large but unimpressive fields. Even during the last Democratic primary cycle, candidates like Joe Biden, Chris Dodd and Mike Gravel benefitted from their participation in the process without seemingly affecting the more serious contest between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton for the nomination. So perhaps the spectacle is a hinderance and an impediment, but does not pose an existential threat to the whole enterprise.

This is perhaps partly attributable to the enduring power of the parties and partisan elites in the nominative process of both parties. The Republican Party has been able to shepherd through a line of succession of known quantities who are broadly acceptable and well-known by the party hierarchy. Democrats for that matter have a much more overt demonstration of elite-power with "superdelegates," party officials invested with votes at the convention purely at their own discretion and not bound by any popular contest.¹⁷⁴

SPECULATIVE COURSES FOR THE 2012 PARTICIPANTS

With these prevailing trends in primary politics, we can make some inferences about the personal outcomes for the most recent crop of presidential primary also-rans, the participants in the 2012 Republican primary. Applying the same selection criteria as above, we find six “viable” unsuccessful primary candidates: Rick Santorum, Newt Gingrich, Ron Paul, Jon Huntsman, Michelle Bachmann and Rick Perry.

An ever-increasing amount of candidates over time have sought employment following their failed presidential bid in the private sector. Heretofore, the 2012 participants appears to be continuing this trend, as only Bachmann and Perry now serve in government. Early evidence also seems to demonstrate that having run for President before and failed is not necessarily a liability, but perhaps an asset. Huntsman and Perry, two candidates who found very little success in 2012, are in early 2013 pondering runs at the nomination in 2016.

THE 2016 PRIMARY

The “Republican line of succession” would lead us to believe that Rick Santorum will be the Republican presidential nominee in 2016. Yet Santorum does not fit well into that line of succession because he was an insurgent candidate from the more staunchly conservative wing of the Republican party. While Santorum has been able to garner the support of similarly conservative activists, his ideological makeup would likely make him less attractive to Republican Party elites as a heir apparent to the nomination than

his relatively more moderate predecessor runners-up for the nomination. However, prevailing trends heretofore are by no means Gospel, and Santorum could inaugurate a new era of more ideologically extreme candidates being the preliminary frontrunners in Republican primaries.

Media appetite for coverage of the 2016 primary season will likely be quite voracious, especially because it will feature likely competitive primaries in both parties, thereby increasing the amount of candidates, primaries, debates and story-lines to cover. Given this high level of attention, the low risk associated with participation, and the lack of a clear frontrunner we can reasonably assume will run in either party, it seems quite plausible that the 2016 primaries will feature a plethora of candidates. Some will earnestly seek the nomination and believe they have the legitimate chance to attain it. But others will likely be there in pursuit of ulterior objectives.

THE RISK/REWARD OF PRIMARY PARTICIPATION

THE LOW COST AND ALMOST NON-EXISTENT RISK OF PRIMARY PARTICIPATION

Participation in the spectacle primary system certainly entails costs. A candidate could suffer under the weight of a punishing schedule and the scrutiny of the press or spend too lavishly and find themselves mired in personal debt. They could sacrifice their previous job or miss other attractive employment while running. But these are

estimable and somewhat avoidable costs, likely worthwhile inconveniences given the level of potential rewards. And while there are costs, the risks of pursuing a primary campaign appear to be shockingly low, especially for candidates not seriously pursuing the nomination.

If a candidate is only participating for the ulterior benefits, they are not overly concerned with electoral outcomes, but rather simply remaining a viable participant. Therefore they are not compelled to work or spend on a comparable level to more serious candidates. A sitting elected official faces very little risk of losing their seat. Therefore, sitting elected officials have little to worry about strategically.

One might think the worst case scenario would be a politician running for President and makes a fool of themselves. And indeed a spectacularly poor performance on such a big stage could be damaging to the personal prospects of a candidate or reveal some underlying weakness as a candidate. But even for those whose candidacies have been considered profound disappointments, their post-primary outcomes are not as dire as one might assume. Rick Perry was widely ridiculed for his lack of preparation and debate gaffes and yet he is still considered a viable potential candidate for the 2016 Republican primary. Wesley Clark, a highly coveted political neophyte just four years earlier, was “persona non grata at the 2008 Democratic National Convention.”¹⁷⁵ Yet as discussed above, Clark’s life has been far from a

disaster since his failure in presidential politics; he enjoys enviable positions in multiple private companies and recently hosted his own television show.

THE UNDER-APPRECIATED RISK OF ANONYMITY

While it is intuitive for people to calculate the potential risk and rewards of deciding to do something, it is more difficult to contemplate the potential consequences of choosing not to do something. Prospective candidates would be wise to consider their personal outcomes should they decide not to seek the presidency. It is possible that for the self-interested candidate, anonymity could be worse than ignominy. Political figures, especially former ones who wish to remain in the public spotlight and maintain their profile, have no other comparable opportunity to the spectacle process for self-aggrandizement. For a self-interested politician, maintaining relevancy is vital, whether they choose to stay in government or go into the private sector. Essentially, the primary process offers significant opportunities for reward, while abstention from the spectacle carries with it a hidden risk of irrelevancy and disappearance from the public mind.

WHY NOT RUN?

The primary process fundamentally changed with introduction of meaningful comprehensive reform in the 1970s. Further structural and normative changes over time have created an environment offering a bevy of benefits and almost no risk whatsoever.

For candidates with a legitimately plausible path to the nomination, these benefits are available even if they fail to reach that goal. And for more quixotic candidates, especially for those with little to lose, the opportunity to partake in such an unparalleled opportunity for exposure and attention should clearly not be squandered. Therefore those whose candidacies are decidedly improbable and are widely ridiculed are not necessarily making poor personal decisions, but rather are rational actors, maximizing their self-interest. Given the personal outcomes of unsuccessful primary participants and the observation of prevailing trends, it seems that the real question prospective candidates should ask themselves is not “why run?” but “why not run?”

¹ The nomenclature of the primary process can be somewhat ambiguous and confusing. An electoral “primary” in common parlance could refer to a single primary contest, a caucus, or a entire primary cycle. Generally, I use “primary” to refer to an entire primary cycle, including the caucuses, for brevity and clarity. When using the term to indicate a single primary contest, it is clear contextually.

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Appendix A: Viable Candidate Employment Data

Candidate, Year Running for President	YEAR	OCCUPATION	Source
Alexander, Lamar, 1996	2007 - 2011	Chairman, US Senate Republican Conference	"Lamar Alexander." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who</i> (R). Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
	2003 -	Member, US Senate	
	2001 - 2002	Goodman vis. professor, practice of pub. svc. Harvard U.	
	1999 - 2001	Private Practice Attorney. Nashville	
	1994 - 1995	Co-Director. Empower America	
	1993 - 1998	Counsel, Baker, Donelson, Bearman & Caldwell, Nashville	
	1991 - 1993	US Secretary of Education	
	1988 - 1991	President, University of Tennessee	
	1987 - 1988	Chairman, Leadership Institute, Belmont College, Nashville	
	1985 - 1987	President's Commission on America's Outdoors	
	1985 - 1986	Chairman National Governors Association	
	1979 - 1987	Governor, State of Tennessee.	
	1970 - 1976	Partner, Dearborn & Ewing, Nashville	
	1969 - 1970	Executive Assistant to Bryce Harlow, Congressional Liaison	
	1967 - 1968	Legislative Assistant to Senator Howard Baker	
	1965 - 1966	Law Clerk to John Minor Wisdom, US Ct. Appeals (5th cir.)	
	1965	Associate, Fowler, Roundtree, Fowler & Robertson, Knoxville	
Anderson, John 1980	1997-	Washington College Law	"John B. Anderson." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who</i> (R) <i>Biographies</i> . Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
	1987 - 2005	Visiting Professor, Nova-Southeastern University	
	1986	Lecturer, Oregon State University	
	1985	Bryn Mawr College	
	1985	vis. Professor of Political Science. Brandeis University	
	1985 -	vis. Professor, U. Mass.	
	1981	vis. Professor, Stanford U.	
	1980	Independent Candidate for President	
	1980	Counsel, Greenberg & Lieberman, LLC	
	1969 - 1979	Member, US House of Representatives	
	1961 - 1981	Member, US House of Representatives	
	1952 - 1955	U.S. Foreign Service, West Berlin	
	1946 - 1952	Law Practice, Rockford	
Baker, Howard 1980	2005 -	Sr. Counsel, Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz	"Howard Baker." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who</i> (R) <i>Biographies</i> . Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
	2001 - 2005	US Ambassador to Japan	
	1995 - 2000	Partner, Baker, Donelson, Bearman & Caldwell	
	1987 - 1988	Chief of Staff to President	
	1985 - 1990	Member, President's Foreign Intelligence Board	
	1985 - 1987, 1988 - 1995	Partner, Baker, Worthington, Crossley, Stansberry & Woolf	

Candidate, Year Running for President	YEAR	OCCUPATION	Source
	1985 - 1987	Partner, Vinson & Elkins LLP	Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus .com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	1981 - 1985	Majority Leader, US Senate	
	1977 - 1981	Minority Leader, US Senate	
	1976	Delegate, United Nations	
	1973 - 1974	Member, US Senate Watergate Commission	
	1967 - 1985	Member, US Senate	
Bauer, Gary 2000	1996 -	Chairman, Campaign for Working Families	"Gary Bauer." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies.</i> Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus .com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	1988 - 1999	President, Family Research. Council	
	1985 - 1987	Undersecretary, US Department of Education	
	1982 - 1985	Deputy Undersecretary, US Department of Education	
	1982	Deputy Assistant Director of Legal Policy	
	1981 - 1982	Sr. Policy Analyst	
	1973 - 1980	Director govt. rels., Direct Mail Mktg. Assn., Washington	
Bayh, Birch 1976	2001 -	Partner, Venable LLP	"Birch Bayh." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies.</i> Accessed 4/6/2013. www.lexisnexus .com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	1979 - 1981	Chairman, US Senate Intelligence Committee	
	1979 - 1981	Sr. Partner., Bayh, Connaughton & Malone PC	
	1963 - 1981	Member, US Senate	
	1959 - 1960	Speaker, Indiana House of Representatives	
	1957 - 1958, 1961 - 1962	Minority Leader, Indiana House of Representatives	
	1954 - 1962	Member, Indiana House of Representatives	
	1952 - 1957	Farmer, Vigo County	
		Member U. Va. Commission on Presidential. Disability & the Twenty-Fifth Amendment	
Bentsen, Lloyd 1976	1988	Vice President Nominee	"Lloyd Bensten." <i>The Almanac of American Politics 1992.</i> Accessed 5/9/2013. www.lexisnexus .com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	1955 - 1971	President, Lincoln Consolidated, Inc.	
	1948 - 1954	U.S. House of Representatives	
	1946 - 1948	Judge, Hidalgo County	
	1945 - 1946	Practicing Attorney Army Air Corps, WWII	
	2009 -	Vice President of the United States	"Joe Biden." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R)</i>
	2008	Vice-Presidential Nominee	
	2007 - 2009	Chairman, US Senate Foreign Relations Committee	

Candidate, Year Running for President	YEAR	OCCUPATION	Source
Biden, Joe 2008	2000	US Representative to UN General Assembly	www (K) Biographies Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus .com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	1991 -	adj. Professor, Widener U. Sch. Law	
	1987	Chairman, US Senate Judiciary Committee	
	1973 - 2009	Member, US Senate	
	1970 - 1972	Member, New Castle County Council	
	1968 - 1972	Private law practice, Wilmington	
Bradley, Bill 2000	2006 -	Member, Board of Directors., Starbucks Coffee Co.	"Bill Bradley." The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies. Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus .com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	2003 -	Member, Board of Directors. Willis Ins. Group, Seagate Tech.	
	2001 - 2004	Chief Outside Advisor, Non-Profit Practice, McKinsey & Co.	
	2000 -	Managing Director, Allen & Co., LLC	
	1998 - 2002	Board of Trustees Princeton U.	
	1998	vis. Professor pub. affairs, U. Notre Dame	
	1997 - 1999	sr. advisor, vice chair internat. coun. J.P. Morgan and Co., Inc	
	1997 - 1998	Essayist, CBS TV Weekend Evening News	
	1997 - 1998	Payne Disting. Professor, Inst. for Internat. Studies, Stanford	
	1997 - 1999	Disting. leadership scholar, chair, U. Md., College Park	
	1979 - 1996	Member, US Senate	
	1967 - 1977	Professional Basketball Player	
Braun, Carol Mosely 2004		Member Coun. Foreign Rels.	"Carol Moseley Braun." SGA Executive Tracker. Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus .com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	2005 -	Founder and Chairman, Ambassador Organics	
	1999 - 2001	US Ambassador to New Zealand and Samoa	
	1993 - 1999	Member, US Senate	
	1979 - 1989	Member, Illinois House of Representatives	
		Assistant Attorney, Davis, Miner and Barnhill Prosecutor, U.S. Attorney's Office Cook County, Recorder of Deeds	
Brown, Jerry 1976, 1980, 1992	2011 -	Governor, State of California	"Jerry Brown." The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies. Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus .com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	2007 - 2011	Attorney General, State of California	
	1998 - 2006	Mayor, City of Oakland, California	
	1989 - 1991	Chairman, California Democratic Party	
	1975 - 1983	Governor, State of California	
	1971 - 1975	Secretary of State, State of California	
	1969 - 1971	Board trustees, L.A. Cmty. Coll.	
	1966 - 1969	Attorney, Tuttle & Taylor, L.A.	
	1964 - 1965	Law Clerk to Justice Mathew Tobriner, California, Supreme C	
	2003 - 2012	Political Analyst, MSNBC	

Candidate, Year Running for President	YEAR	OCCUPATION	Source
Buchanan, Pat 1992, 1996	2002 - 2007	Co-Founder, Editor, The American Conservative	"Pat Buchanan." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who</i> (R) <i>Biographies</i> . Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
	2000	Reform Party Candidate for President	
	1997 - 1999, 2001 -	Syndicated Columnist, Creators Syndicate	
	1987 - 91, 1993 - 1995	Syndicated Columnist, Tribune Media Svcs	
	1985 - 1987	White House Director of Communications	
	1978 - 1985	Syndicated Columnist, Chicago Tribune-NY News Syndicate	
	1978 - 1982	Commentator, NBC Radio Network	
	1975 - 1978	Syndicated Columnist, NY Times Spl. Features	
	1975 - 1977	columnist, TV Guide	
	1969 - 1973	Special Assistant to President	
	1966 - 1969	Executive Assistant to President	
	1964 - 1965	Assistant Editorial Editor, St. Louis Globe-Democrat	
	1962 - 1964	Editorial Writer, St. Louis Globe-Democrat	
Bush, George H. W. 1980	1998 - 2003	sr. Advisor, Carlyle Group	"George H.W. Bush." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who</i> (R) <i>Biographies</i> . Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
	1989 - 1993	President of the United States	
	1981 - 1989	Vice President of the United States	
	1978	Adj. Professor Administrative Science, Rice U. Jones Sch. Bus., Houston	
	1977 - 1980	Chairman, First International Bank	
	1976 - 1977	Director, Central Intelligence Agency	
	1974 - 1976	Chief of US Liaison Office, People's Republic of China	
	1973 - 1974	Chairman, Republican Nat. Com. (RNC)	
	1971 - 1973	United States Ambassador to United Nations	
	1967 - 1971	Member, US House of Representatives	
	1964 - 1966	Chairman of the Board, Zapata Off Shore Co.	
	1956 - 1964	President, Zapata Off Shore Co., Houston	
	1953 - 1959	co-Founder, Director, Zapata Petroleum Corp., Midland	
	1951	co-Founder, Bush-Overbey Oil Devel. Co.	
Byrd, Robert 1976	1977 - 1980	Majority Leader, US Senate	"Byrd, Robert." <i>The Associated Press Candidate Biographies</i> . Accessed: 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
	1959 - 2010	Member, US Senate	
	1953 - 1959	Member, US House of Representatives	
	1951 - 1953	Member, WV Senate	
	1947 - 1951	Member, WV House	

Candidate, Year Running for President	YEAR	OCCUPATION	Source
Church, Frank 1976	1957 - 1981	Member, US Senate	"CHURCH, Frank Forrester - Biographical Information." <i>Biographical Directory of the United States Congress.</i> Accessed 4/16/2013. http:// bioguide.congre ss.gov/scripts/ biodisplay.pl? index=c000388
	1942 - 1946	US Army	
		United States Delegate to United Nations	
Clark, Wesley 2004	2009 -	National co-Chairman, Growth Energy	"Wesley Clark." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies.</i> Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexis .com/ hottopics/ lnacademic .
	2006-	sr. Fellow, Lecturer, Ronald W. Burkle Ctr. for Internat. Rels.,	
	2006 -	Chairman of the Board, Rodman & Renshaw LLC	
	2004 -	vice-Chair, sr. Advisor, James Lee Witt Associate, LLC	
	2001 - 2003	Military Analyst, CNN	
	2001 - 2003	Chairman, CEO, Wesley K. Clark & Associates, LLC	
	2001 - 2003	mng. Director of Merchant Banking, Stephens Group, Inc.	
	2000 - 2001	Consultant, Stephens Inc.	
	1997 - 2000	Supreme Allied Commander, NATO, Europe (SACEUR)	
	1997 - 2000	Commander, US European Command, (USEUCOM)	
	1996 - 1997	Commander, US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)	
	1994 - 1996	Director of Strategic Plans and Policy, the Joint Staff, US Army	
	1992 - 1994	Commander, 1st Cavalry Division, US Army	
	1991 - 1992	Deputy Chief of Staff for Concepts, Doctrine, and Development	
	1989 - 1991	Commander, National Training Center, US Army	
	1986 - 1988	Commander, 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, US Army	
	1983 - 1984	Chief, Army's Study Group, Office Chief of Staff of Army	
	1983	Chief, Plans Integration Division, Office Deputy Chief of Staff	
	1980 - 1982	Commander, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor, 4th Infantry Division	
	1975 - 1976	Instructor to Assistant Professor of Social Science, U.S. Military Academy	
	1975 - 1976	Special Assistant to Director, Office Management & Budget	
	1975 - 1976	White House Fellow	
	1984 - 1986	Commander, Operational Group, US Army	
	2009 - 2013	US Secretary of State	"Hillarv
	2003 - 2011	Member, US Senate Armed Services Committee	

Candidate, Year Running for President	YEAR	OCCUPATION	Source
Clinton, Hillary 2008	2001 - 2002	Member, US Senate Budget Committee	Clinton." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who</i> (R) Biographies. Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
	2001 - 2011	Member, US Senate Health, Education, Labor & Pensions Co	
	2001 - 2011	Member, US Senate Environment & Public Works Committee	
	2001 - 2009	Member, US Senate	
	1993	Chair, Presidential Task Force on National Health Care Reform	
	1977 - 1992	Partner, Rose Law Firm, Little Rock	
	1979 - 1980	Assistant Professor of Law, U. Ark. Sch. Law, Little Rock	
	1974 - 1977	Assistant Professor of Law, Director Legal Aid Clinic, U. Ark.	
	1974	Counsel, Impeachment Inquiry Staff, US House Judiciary Co	
	1973 - 1974	Legal Council, Carnegie Council on Children	
Connally, John 1980	1971 - 1973	US Secretary of the Treasury	"Texas Politics - Governors: John Connally." <i>University of Texas at Austin</i> . Accessed 4/16/2013. http://www.laits.utexas.edu/txp_media/html/exec/governors/25.html
		Attorney, Partner, Vinson and Elkins	
	1963 - 1969	Governor, State of TX	
		US Secretary of the Navy	
		US Navy	
Crane, Phil 1980		Legislative Assistant to Representative Lyndon Johnson	"Phil Crane." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who</i> (R) Biographies. Accessed: 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
	1969 - 2005	Member, Joint Committee on Taxation	
	1969 - 2005	Member, US House of Representatives	
	1967 - 1968	Director schs., Westminster Academy.	
	1963 - 1967	Assistant Professor of History, Bradley U.	
	1959 - 1962	Teaching Assistant, Indiana U.	
Cranston, Alan 1984	1956 - 1958	Advt. mgr., Hopkins Syndicate, Inc.	"Cranston, Alan." <i>The Almanac of American Politics 1997</i>
	1969 - 1983	Member, US Senate	
	1959 - 1967	Controller of the State of California	
	1953 - 1957	Founder and President, California Democratic Council	
	1949 - 1952	President, United World Federalists	

Candidate, Year Running for President	YEAR	OCCUPATION	Source
	1944 - 1948	US Army	Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus .com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
Dean, Howard 2004	2009 -	sr. Strategic Advisor, McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP	"Howard Dean." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies.</i> Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus .com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	2009 -	Chairman Emeritus, Democratic National Committee	
	2005 - 2009	Chairman, Democratic National Committee, Washington	
	1991 - 2003	Governor, State of Vermont	
	1986 - 1991	Lt. Governor, State of Vermont	
	1985 - 1986	Assistant Minority Leader, Vermont House of Representatives	
	1982 - 1986	Member, Vermont House of Representatives	
	1978 - 1982	Internal Medicine Specialist, Shelburne, Vt.	
Dodd, Chris 2008	1978 - 1982	Intern and Resident, Internal Medicine, Med. Ctr. Hosp. Vermont	"Chris Dodd." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies.</i> Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus .com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	1995 - 1997	General Chairman, Democratic National Committee	
	2011 -	Chairman, CEO, Motion Picture Association of America (MPA)	
	2007 - 2011	Chairman, US Senate Banking Housing & Urban Affairs Committee	
	2001 - 2003	Chairman, US Senate Rules & Administration Committee	
	1981 - 2011	Member, US Senate	
	1975 - 1980	Member, US House of Representatives	
	1973 - 1974	Attorney, Suisman, Shapiro, Wool & Brennan	
Dole, Bob 1988	1966 - 1968	Member, Peace Corps, Dominican Republic	"Robert Dole." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies.</i> Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus .com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	2003 -	spl. Counsel, Alston & Bird LLP	
	1997 - 2002	Counsel, Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard, McPherson & Hand	
	1996	Republican Candidate for President	
	1995 - 1996	Majority Leader, US Senate	
	1987 - 1995	Minority Leader, US Senate	
	1985 - 1987	Majority Leader, US Senate	
	1981 - 1985	Chairman, US Senate Finance Committee	
	1976	Vice-Presidential Nominee	
	1971 - 1973	Chairman, Republican National Committee	
	1969 - 1996	Member, US Senate	
	1963 - 1969	Member, US House of Representatives	
	1961 - 1963	Member, US House of Representatives	
	1953 - 1961	Attorney, Russell County	

Candidate, Year Running for President	YEAR	OCCUPATION	Source
	1951 - 1953	Member, Kansas House of Representatives	
du Pont, Pete 1988	1994 - 1997	National Review Institute	"Pete du Pont." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies.</i> Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
	1985 - 1987	Chairman, Hudson Institute	
	1985 - 1977 - 85	Attorney, Richards, Layton and Finger	
		Governor, State of Delaware	
	1968 - 70	Member, US House of Representatives	
	1968 - 70	Member, Delaware House of Representatives	
		Chairman of the Board, National Center for Policy Analysis	
		Member Staff, Photo Products Dept., E.I. duPont Co.	
Edwards, John 2004, 2008	2004	Vice-Presidential Nominee	"John Edwards." <i>The Associated Press Candidate Biographies.</i> Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
	1999 - 2005	Member, US Senate	
		Attorney	
Forbes, Steve 1996, 2000	1990 -	Editor-in-Chief, Forbes Inc.	"Steve Forbes." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies.</i> Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
	1990 -	President, CEO, Forbes Inc.	
	1982 - 90	Dep. Editor-in-Chief Forbes Magazine, Forbes Inc.	
	1980 - 90	President, COO, Forbes Inc.	
Gephardt, Dick 1988, 2004	2009-	Member of the Board, CenturyLink, Inc. (formerly CenturyTel)	"Richard Gephardt." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies.</i> Accessed
	2009-	Member of the Board, Ford Motor Co.	
	2007-	Member of the Board, Embarq Corp.	
	2006-	Member of the Board, Centene Corp.	
	2006-	Member of the Board, Spirit Aerosystems Holdings, Inc.	
	2005-	Member of the Board, US Steel Corp.	
	2005 -	sr. Counsel, DLA Piper, LLP	
	2005 -	Founder, President, CEO, Gephardt Group	
	1995 - 2002	Minority Leader, US House of Representatives	

Candidate, Year Running for President	YEAR	OCCUPATION	Source
	1989 - 1994	Majority leader, US House of Representatives	4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus.com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	1977 - 2005	Member, Missouri House of Representatives	
	1971 - 1976	Alderman, 14th ward, City of St. Louis	
	1968 - 1971	Democratic Committeeman, 14th ward, City of St. Louis	
	1965 - 1976	Partner, Thompson & Mitchell Law Firm	
		sr. Advisor, FTI Consulting	
Giuliani, Rudy 2008		Consultant, Goldman Sachs & Co.	"Rudy Giuliani." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies</i> . Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus.com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	2006	Member, Iraq Study Group (ISG)	
	2005 -	Partner, Bracewell & Giuliani LLP	
	2004 - 2007	Chairman, CEO, Giuliani Capital Advisors LLC	
	2002 -	Chairman, CEO, Giuliani Partners LLC	
	1994 - 2001	Mayor, City of New York	
	1993	Candidate for Mayor of New York City	
	1990 - 1993	Attorney, Anderson, Kill, Olick & Oshinsky PC	
	1989 - 1990	Attorney, White & Case	
	1989	Candidate for Mayor of New York City	
	1983 - 89	US Attorney (southern dist.) N.Y., US Dept. Justice	
	1981 - 1983	Associate Attorney General, US Dept. Justice	
	1977 - 1981	Attorney, Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler	
	1975 - 1977	Associate Deputy Attorney general, US Department of Just.	
	1973 - 1975	Executive Assistant US Attorney	
Glenn, John 1984	1970 - 1973	Assistant US Attorney (southern dist.) NY, US Dept. Justice	"John Glenn." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies</i> . Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus.com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	1968 - 1970	Law Clerk to Hon. Lloyd Francis McMahon, US Dist. Ct. (sou)	
	1987 - 1995	Chairman, US Senate Governmental Affairs Committee	
	1975 - 1999	Member, US Senate	
	1966 - 1974	President, Royal Crown International	
	1966 - 1974	V.P. of Corporate Development, Royal Crown Cola Co.	
Gore, Al 1988	1962	Pilot, Mercury-Atlas 6 'Friendship 7' spacecraft	"Al Gore." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies</i> . Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus.com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	1943	Commander, 2d Lt., United State Marine Corps	
	2005 - 2013	co-Founder, Chairman, Current TV	
	2004 -	co-Founder, Chairman, Generation Investment Mgmt. Inc.	
	2000	Democratic Presidential Nominee	
	1993 - 2001	Vice President of the United States	
	1985 - 1993	Member, US Senate	Accessed 4/16/2013/.
	1983 - 1985	Member, US House of Representatives	

Candidate, Year Running for President	YEAR	OCCUPATION	Source
	1977 - 1983	Member, US House of Representatives	www.lexisnexus.com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	1971 - 1976	Homebuilder and Land Developer, Tanglewood Home Build	
	1971 - 1976	Investigative Reporter, Editorial Writer, The Tennessean	
Gramm, Phil 1996	2012 -	vis. Scholar, American Enterprise Institute (AEI)	"Phil Gramm." The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies. Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus.com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	2012 -	sr. Partner, US Policy Metrics	
	2002 - 2012	vice-Chairman, mng. Director, UBS Warburg	
	1995 - 2000	Chairman, US Senate Banking Committee	
	1991 - 1995	Chairman National Republican Senatorial Committee	
	1985 - 2002	Member, US Senate	
	1979 - 1985	Member, US House of Representatives	
	1971 - 1978	Partner, Gramm & Associates	
	1973 - 1978	Professor, Tex. A&M U.	
	1967 - 1978	Faculty, Department of Economics, Tex. A&M U.	
Gravel, Mike 2008	1989	Founder, President, The Democracy Found.	"Mike Gravel." The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies. Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus.com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	1969 - 1981	Member, US Senate	
	1965 - 1966	Speaker, Alaska House of Representatives	
	1962 - 1966	Member, Alaska House of Representatives	
Harkin, Tom 1992	2009 -	Chairman, US Senate Health, Education, Labor, & Pensions C	"Tom Harkin." The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies. Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus.com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	2007 - 2009	Chairman, US Senate Agricultural, Nutrition, & Forestry Cor	
	2001 - 2003	Chairman, US Senate Agricultural, Nutrition, & Forestry Cor	
	2001	Chairman, US Senate Agricultural, Nutrition, & Forestry Cor	
	1985 -	Member, US Senate	
	1975 - 1985	Member, US House of Representatives	
	1973 - 1974	Attorney, Polk County Legal Aid Society	
	1970	Staff Member, US House Select Committee on US Involvement	
Harris, Fred 1976	1976 -	Professor of Political Science, U. N.Mex.	"Fred Harris." The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R)
	1964 - 73	Member, US Senate	
	1956 - 64	Member, Oklahoma State Senate	

Candidate, Year Running for President	YEAR	OCCUPATION	Source
	1954 - 64	Founder, sr. Partner, Harris, Newcombe, Redman & Doolin	www (K) Biographies. Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexis .com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
Hart, Gary 1984	2009 -	Scholar in Residence, Wirth Chair Professor, U. Colo. Sch. Pu	"Gary Hart." The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies. Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexis.c om/hottopics/ lnacademic.
	2009 -	Vice-Chairman, Homeland Security Advisory Council, US De	
	1988 -	of counsel, Strategic and Legal Advisor on International Law	
	1985	of counsel, Davis, Graham & Stubbs	
	1976 - 84	Member, US Senate	
	1970 - 72	National Campaign Director, George McGovern Presidential	
	1967 - 70, 1972 - 1974	Private Attorney	
	1967	Special Assistant to Secretary of the Interior	
Huckabee, Mike 2008	1964 - 1965	Attorney, US Department of Justice	"Mike Huckabee." The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies. Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexis .com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	2012 -	Host, Syndicated Radio Program, Cumulus Media Network,	
	2009 -	Host, Cumulus Media Network, The Huckabee Report	
	2008 -	Host, Huckabee, Fox News Channel	
	2008 -	Political commentator, Fox News Channel	
	1996 - 2007	Governor, State of Arkansas	
	1993 - 1996	Lt. Governor, State of Ark., Little Rock	
	1992 - 1996	President, Cambridge Comm., Texarkana, Ark.	
	1987 - 1992	President, KBSC-TV	
	1986 - 1996	Pastor, Beech St. 1st Bapt. Ch., Texarkana, Ark.	
Humphrey, Hubert 1976	1980 - 1985	Pastor, Immanuel Bapt. Ch., Pine Bluff, Ark.	"Vice President Hubert Horatio Humphrey." LBJ Library. Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lbjlib.utex as.edu/ johnson/ archives.hom/ faqs/ humphrey/ hhh_home.asp
	1974 - 1975	Pastor, Walnut St. Bapt. Ch., Arkadelphia	
		vis. Professor, Macalester College, St. Paul	
	1971 - 1978	Member, US Senate	
	1969 - 1971	Professor University of Minnesota	
	1969 - 1971	Professor, Macalester College	
	1968	Democratic Presidential Nominee	
	1965 - 1969	Vice President of the United States	
	1949 - 1964	Member, US Senate	
	1946 - 1948	Mayor, City of Minneapolis	

Candidate, Year Running for President	YEAR	OCCUPATION	Source
Hunter, Duncan 2008	2003 - 2007	Chairman Armed Services Committee, US House	"Hunter, Duncan." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies.</i> Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic .
	1981 - 2009	Member, US House of Representatives	
		Private Attorney	
Jackson, Jesse 1984, 1988	1997 - 2000	Special Envoy of the President & Secretary of State for the Pr	"Jesse Jackson." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies.</i> Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic .
	1997 -	Founder, The Wall St. Project	
	1991 - 1996	Shadow Senator, US Senate	
	1984 -	Founder, President, Rainbow / Push Coalition, Inc.	
	1984	Founder, Citizenship Education Fund	
	1977 - 1996	Founder, PUSH-Excel and PUSH for Economic Justice	
	1971 - 1996	Founder, Executive Director, Operation PUSH (People United)	
	1967 - 1971	National Director, Operation Breadbasket Project, Southern C	
	1966 - 1967	Chicago Director, Operation Breadbasket Project, Southern C	
Jackson, Scoop 1972, 1976	1968	Ordained to Ministry, Baptist Church	"JACKSON, Henry Martin (Scoop) - Biographical Information." <i>Biographical Directory of the United States Congress.</i> Accessed 4/16/2013. http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=j000013
	1938 - 1940	Prosecuting Attorney, Snohomish County	
	1946	President, International Maritime Conference	
	1941 - 1952	Member, US House of Representatives	
	1953 - 1983	Member, US Senate	
Kemp, Jack 1988	1960	Chairman, Democratic National Committee	"KEMP, Jack French - Biographical Information." <i>Biographical</i>
	1996	Vice-Presidential Nominee	
	1989 - 1993	United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development	
	1971 - 1989	Member, US House of Representatives	
	1969	Staff, Republican National Committee	

Candidate, Year Running for President	YEAR	OCCUPATION	Source
	1967	Special Assistant to the Governor of California	Biographical Directory of the United States Congress. Accessed 4/16/2013. http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=K000086
	1957 - 1970	Professional Football Player,	
Kennedy, Edward 1980	1962 - 2009	Member, US Senate	"Edward Kennedy." <i>The Associated Press Candidate Biographies</i> . Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic .
	1961 - 1962	Assistant District Attorney, Suffolk County	
	1951 - 1953	US Army	
Kerrey, Bob 1992	2001 - 2010	President, The New School	"Bob Kerrey." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies</i> . Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic .
	1995 - 1999	Chairman, Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC)	
	1989 - 2001	Member, US Senate	
	1987 - 1989	Partner, Printon, Kane & Co.	
	1983 - 1987	Governor, State of Nebraska	
	1972 - 1975	Owner, Founder, Prairie Life Center	
	1972 - 1975	Owner, Founder, Developer, Grandmother's Restaurants	
Keyes, Alan 1996, 2000, 2008	2004	Candidate for US Senate	"Alan Keyes." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies</i> . Accessed 4/16/2013.
	2002	Host, Alan Keyes: Making Sense	
	1996	Founder & President, The Declaration Found	
	1994 - 2000	National Talk Radio Show Host, The Alan Keyes Show: America's	
	1992	Candidate for US Senate	
	1991 - 1992	Syndicated Columnist, Scripps Howard	
	1991	Interim President, Ala. A&M U.	
	1989 - 1992	President, Citizens Against Government Waste	
	1988	Candidate for US Senate	
	1987 - 1989	Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute	

Candidate, Year Running for President	YEAR	OCCUPATION	Source
	1985 - 1988.	Assistant Secretary of state for International Organizations	www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
	1985 - 1988	Assistant Secretary for International Organizational Affairs, U	
	1983 - 1985	US Representative to United Nations Economic and Social C	
	1981 - 1983	Policy Planning Staff, US Department of State	
	1980 - 1981	Desk Officer, US State Department, Zimbabwe	
	1979 - 1980	Consular Officer, US State Department	
	1978	Foreign Service Officer, US State Department	
Kucinich, Dennis 2004, 2008	1997 -	Member, US House of Representatives	"Dennis Kucinich." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies.</i> Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
	1995 - 1997	Member, Ohio State Senate	
	1985 - 1995	President, K Comm.	
	1981 - 1982	Councilman, Cleveland City Council	
	1977 - 1979	Mayor, City of Cleveland	
	1976 - 1977	Clerk of Courts, Cleveland Municipal Court	
	1970 - 1975	Councilman, Cleveland City Council	
LaRouche, Lyndon 1996, 2000		V.P. of Sales & Marketing, Town & Country Printing	"Lyndon LaRouche." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies.</i> Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
	2004 -	Founder, Lyndon LaRouche Political Action Committee	
	1990	Candidate for US House of Representatives	
	1980 - 1983	Chairman, Advisory Committee, National Democratic Policy	
	1981 - 1987	Member, Board of Directors., Fusion Energy Found	
	1975 - 1987	Co-founder, Fusion Energy Found	
	1974 -	Founder, Contributing Editor, Executive Intelligence Review	
	1952 - 1972	Management Consultant	
Lieberman, Joe 2004	1947 - 1948	Management Consultant	"Joseph Lieberman." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies.</i> Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
	2007 - 2013	Chairman, US Senate Homeland Security & Governmental. A	
	2001 - 2003	Chairman, US Senate Governmental Affairs Committee	
	2001	Chairman, US Senate Governmental Affairs Committee	
	1995 - 2001	Chairman, Democratic Leadership Council	
	1989 - 2013	Member, US Senate	
	1983 - 1989	Attorney General, State of Connecticut	
	1975 - 1981	Majority Leader, Connecticut State Senate	
	1972 - 1983	Partner, Lieberman, Segaloff & Wolfson	
	1971 - 1981	Member, Connecticut State Senate	
	1968	co-Chairman, Senator Robert F. Kennedy Presidential Campa	
	1967 - 1969	Attorney, Wiggin & Dana	

Candidate, Year Running for President	YEAR	OCCUPATION	Source
Lugar, Richard 1996	2013 -	Disting. Professor, U. Indpls.	"Richard Lugar." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who</i> (R) <i>Biographies</i> . Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic .
	2013 -	vis. Disting. Professor of Public Policy, Georgetown U. Public	
	1983 - 1984	Chairman, National Republican Senatorial Committee	
	1995 - 2001	Chairman, US Senate Agricultural Nutrition & Forestry Com	
	2003 - 2006	Chairman, US Senate Foreign Relations Committee	
	1985 - 1986	Chairman, US Senate Foreign Relations Committee	
	1977 - 2013	Member, US Senate	
	1976	vis. Professor of Political Science, U. Indpls.	
	1968 - 1975	Mayor, City of Indianapolis.	
McCain, John 2000	2009 -	Member, US Senate Indian Affairs Committee	"John McCain." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who</i> (R) <i>Biographies</i> . Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic .
	2009 -	Member, US Senate Homeland Security & Governmental Aff	
	2009 -	Member, US Senate Health, Education, Labor & Pensions Co	
	2009 -	Member, US Senate Energy & National Resources Committee	
	2009 -	Ranking Member, US Senate Armed Services Committee	
	2008	Republican Presidential Nominee	
	2005 - 2007	Chairman, US Senate Indian Affairs Committee	
	2003 - 2005	Chairman, US Senate Commerce Science & Transportation C	
	1997 - 2001	Chairman, US Senate Commerce Science & Transportation C	
	1995 - 1997	Chairman, US Senate Indian Affairs Committee	
	1987 -	Member, US Senate	
	1983 - 1986	Member, US House of Representatives	
	1977 - 1981	Director, Navy Senate Liaison Office	
McCormack, Ellen 1976	1980	Presidential Candidate, Pro-Life Party	Martin, Douglas. "Ellen McCormack, Anti-Abortion Presidential Candidate, Dies at 84." <i>The New York Times</i> . March 29, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/30/us/30mccormack.html?_r=0
		UN Global Ambassdor on Hunger	"George

Candidate, Year Running for President	YEAR	OCCUPATION	Source
McGovern, George 1968, 1984		Founder, Americans for Common Sense	McGovern." <i>AP Candidate Bios.</i> Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus .com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	1976	US Delegate to United Nations General Assembly	
	1963 - 81	Member, US Senate	
	1961 - 1962	Director, Food for Peace Program	"McGOVERN, George Stanley - Biographical Information." <i>Biographical Directory of the United States Congress.</i> Accessed 4/16/2013. http:// bioguide.congre ss.gov/scripts/ biobdisplay.pl? index=m000452
	1957 - 1961	Member, U.S. House	
		Professor, Northwestern University	
		Professor, Dakota Wesleyan University	
		US Air Force	
Paul, Ron 2008	1997 - 2013	Member, US House of Representatives	"Ron Paul." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies.</i> Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus .com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	1988	Libertarian candidate for President	
	1979 - 1985	Member, US House of Representatives	
	1976 - 1977	Member, US House of Representatives	
	1968	Private Practice Physician	
	1965 - 1968	OB-GYN Trainer, U. Pitts.	
	1961 - 1962	Intern, Resident, Henry Ford Hospital	
Reagan, Ronald 1976	1981 - 1989	President of the United States	"Ronald Reagan." <i>AP Candidate Bios.</i> Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexus .com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	1967 - 1975	Governor of the State of California	
	1942 - 1946	Army Air Corps	
	1932 - 1937	GE Representative	
	1932 - 1937	play-by-play announcer of University of Iowa football games	
		President Screen Actors Guild	

Candidate, Year Running for President	YEAR	OCCUPATION	Source
Richardson, Bill 2008	2011 -	Chairman, APCO Worldwide Global Political Strategies (GPS)	"Bill Richardson." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who</i> (R) Biographies. Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
	2011 -	Special Envoy for Hemispheric Affairs, Organization of America	
	2005 - 06	Chairman, Democratic Governors Association	
	2004	Chairman, Democratic National Convention (DNC)	
	2003 - 2011	Governor, State of New Mexico	
	2001 - 2002	sr. mng. Director, Kissinger McLarty	
	1998 - 2001	US Secretary of Energy	
	1997 - 98	Permanent US Representative to United Nations	
	1993 - 1994	Chairman, US House Natural Resources Subcommittee on N	
	1983 - 1997	Member, US House of Representatives	
	1983 - 1985	Chairman, Congressional Hispanic Caucus	
	1978	Executive Director, Bernalillo County Democratic Committee	
	1978	Executive Director, New Mexico State Democratic Committee	
	1975 - 78	Staff Member, US Senate Foreign Relations Committee	
	1973 - 75	Staff Member, US State Department	
	1971 - 72	Staff Member to Rep. F. Bradford Morris, US House of Repre	
Robertson, Pat 1988	1995 -	Chairman, Porchlight Entertainment, Inc.	"Pat Robertson." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who</i> (R) Biographies. Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
	1995 -	Chairman, Starguide Digital Networks, Inc.	
	1993 -	Founder, Chairman, Asia Pacific Media Corp.	
	1990 - 97	Founder, Chairman, Internat. Family Entertainment, Inc.	
	1990 -	Founder, President, Chairman, The American Center for Law	
	1989 -	Founder, President, The Christian Coalition	
	1982	Member, Board of Directors, United Virginia Bank	
	1978 -	Founder, Chairman, Operation Blessing International Relief a	
	1977 -	Founder, Chancellor, President, Regent U. (formerly CBN U.)	
	1968 -	Host, the 700 Club	
	1960 -	Founder, CEO, Chairman, Christian Broadcasting Network	
Romney, Mitt 2008	2003 - 2007	Governor, Commonwealth of Massachusetts	"Mitt Romney." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who</i> (R) Biographies. Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
	1999 - 2002	President, CEO, Salt Lake Organizing Committee (Winter Olympics)	
	1994	Candidate for US Senate	
	1992 - 2002, 2009 - 2011, 2012-	Member, Board of Directors, Marriott International, Inc.	
	1991 - 2001	Chairman, CEO, Bain & Co., Inc., Boston	
	1986 - 2001	Member, Board of Directors, Staples Inc.	
	1984 - 2001	mng. Partner, CEO, Bain Capital, LLC	
	1978 - 1984	V.P., Bain & Co., Inc.	

Candidate, Year Running for President	YEAR	OCCUPATION	Source
	1977 - 1978	Consultant, Bain & Co., Inc.	Inacademic.
	1975 - 1977	Consultant, Boston Consulting Group	
Sharpton, Al 2004	2011 -	Host, PoliticsNation	"Al Sharpton." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies.</i> Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/Inacademic .
	2006 -	Host, Daily National Talk Radio Program, Keepin It Real with Al Sharpton	
	1997	Candidate, Mayor of New York City	
	1994 - 1998	Director Ministers Division, National Rainbow Push Coalition	
	1994	Candidate, US Senate	
	1992	Candidate, US Senate	
	1991 -	Founder, President, CEO, National Action Network, Inc.	
	1988	Candidate, US Senate	
	1978	Candidate, NY State Senate	
	1973 - 1980	Road Manager, James Brown Concert Tours	
	1971	Founder, National Youth Movement	
	1969	Youth Director, Operation BreadBasket	
Shriver, Sargent 1976		Partner, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacobson	"R. Sargent Shriver." <i>John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum.</i> Accessed 4/16/2013. www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/The-Kennedy-Family/R-Sargent-Shriver.aspx
	1972	Vice-Presidential Nominee	
	1970	Chairman, Congressional Leadership for the Future (CLF)	
	1968 - 1970	US Ambassador to France	
	1964 - 1968	Director, Office of Economic Opportunity	
	1961 - 1966	Director, Peace Corps	
		Director, Catholic Interracial Council	
		Assistant Editor, Newsweek	
Simon, Paul 1988		US Navy	"Simon, Paul Martin." <i>American National Biography Online.</i> Accessed 4/16/2013. http://
	1997 -	Director Simon Public Policy Institute, Southern Illinois Univ	
	1985 - 1997	Member US Senate	
	1975 - 1985	Member US House of Representatives	
	1973	Professor Sangamon State University	
	1973	Professor Harvard University	
	1969 - 1973	Lt. Governor, State of Illinois	
	1955 - 1969	Member, Illinois House of Representatives	
	1951 - 1953	US Army	

Candidate, Year Running for President	YEAR	OCCUPATION	Source
	1948 - 1966	Owner, Troy Tribune	www.anb.org/ articles/ 16/16-03565.ht ml
Thompson, Fred 2008		vis. Fellow, American Enterprise Institute	"Fred Thompson." <i>The Complete Marquis Who's Who (R) Biographies.</i> Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexis .com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	1994 - 2003	Member, US Senate	
	1991 - 1994	Attorney, Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn	
	1982	spl. Counsel, US Senate Intelligence Committee	
	1980 - 1981	spl. Counsel, US Senate Foreign Relations Committee	
	1980	spl. Counsel to Governor, State of Tennessee	
	1975 - 1994	Private Attorney	
	1973 - 1974	Minority Counsel, Watergate Commission	
	1969 - 1972	Assistant U.S. Attorney (mid. dist.) Tennessee, US Dept. Justi	
Tsongas, Paul 1992	1979 - 1985	Member, US Senate	"Paul Tsongas." <i>AP Candidate Bios.</i> Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexis .com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	1975 - 1979	Member, US House of Representatives	
	1973 - 1975	Middlesex County Commissioner	
	1969 - 1971	Assistant State Attorney General	
	1968 - 1972	Member, Lowell City Council	
		Member, Peace Corps	
Udall, Mo 1976	1961 - 1991	Member, US House of Representatives	"Mo Udall." <i>AP Candidate Bios.</i> Accessed 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexis .com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	1952 - 1954	Pima County Attorney	
	1948 - 1949	Professional Basketball Player	
	1942 - 1946	US Army	
Wallace, George 1976	1983 - 1987	Governor, State of Alabama	"George Wallace." <i>AP Candidate Bios.</i> Accessed: 4/16/2013. www.lexisnexis .com/ hottopics/ lnacademic.
	1971 - 1979	Governor, State of Alabama	
	1968	Presidential Candidate, American Independent Party	
	1962 - 1967	Governor, State of Alabama	
	1958	Candidate for Governor of Alabama	
	1953 - 1959	District Court Judge	
	1946 - 1947	Assistant State Attorney General	
		Army Air Corps	

Appendix B: Published Works by 2008 Candidates

Candidate	Year	Party	Book	Year
Edwards, John	2004, 2008	Democrat		
Kucinich, Dennis	2004, 2008	Democrat	The Courage to Survive	2007
			A Prayer for America	2003
Biden, Joe	2008	Democrat	Promises to Keep: On Life and Politics	2008
Clinton, Hillary	2008	Democrat	Living History	2004
			It Takes a Village	1996
Dodd, Chris	2008	Democrat		
Gravel, Mike	2008	Democrat	Citizen Power: A Mandate for Change	2008
Richardson, Bill	2008	Democrat	Valleys of Death: A Memoir of the Korean War	2010
			Between Worlds: The Making of an American Life	2007
			Bachelor Brothers' Bed & Breakfast Pillow Book	1998
			Bachelor Brothers' Bed & Breakfast	1997
			Bachelor Brothers' Bedside Companion	1996
			Queen of All the Dustballs: And Other Epics of Everyday Life	1992
Keyes, Alan	1996, 2000, 2008	Republican	Our Character, Our Future	1996
			Masters of the Dream	1996
Giuliani, Rudy	2008	Republican	Leadership	2005
Huckabee, Mike	2008	Republican	Dear Chandler, Dear Scarlett: A Grandfather's Thoughts on Faith, Family, and the Things That Matter Most	2012
			A Simple Christmas: Twelve Stories That Celebrate the True Holiday Spirit	2012
			Can't Wait Till Christmas	2010
			A Simple Government: Twelve Things We Really Need from Washington (and a Trillion That We Don't!)	2011
			Character Makes a Difference: Where I'm From, Where I've Been and What I Believe	2007
			Do the Right Thing: Inside the Movement That's Bringing Common Sense Back to America	2009
			Living Beyond Your Lifetime: How to Be Intentional about the Legacy You Leave	2000
			From Hope to Higher Ground: 12 STEPS to Restoring America's Greatness	2007
			Kids Who Kill	1998
Hunter, Duncan	2008	Republican	Victory in Iraq	2010
Paul, Ron	2008	Republican	The Revolution: A Manifesto	2009
			End the Fed	2009
			Liberty Defined: 50 Essential Issues That Affect Our Freedom	2012

Candidate	Year	Party	Book	Year
			The Case for Gold	2012
			A Foreign Policy of Freedom: Peace, Commerce and Honest Friendship	2012
			Pillars of Prosperity: Free Markets, Honest Money, Private Property	2008
			Freedom Under Siege	2007
			Mises and Austrian Economics: A Personal View	2008
Romney, Mitt	2008	Republican	No Apology: The Case for American Greatness	2010
			Turnaround: Crisis, Leadership, and the Olympic Games	2007
			Mitt Romney: On Leadership, Faith, and American Values	2012
Thompson, Fred	2008	Republican	Teaching the Pig to Dance: A Memoir of Growing Up and Second Chances	2010